RAIL - Back On Track Forum

Perth Forrestfield-Airport Link
Infrastructure Australia (2016)
URL: https://www.infrastructureaustralia.gov.au/projects/forrestfield-airport-link

QuoteThe project would provide a new 8.5km rail spur to the airport, with three new railway stations and two bus interchanges. The project provides benefits in safety, transport user time and resource savings, and rail de-crowding; as well as significant environmental benefits.

Main findings were that the project would be about $1.9 billion to deliver, including lengthly 8.5 km bored tunnels. This is significant, as it would suggest that long tunnels with few stations could also be a potentially viable approach to improve the SEQ rail network. The BCR was easily net positive, coming in at around 1.4.

Cost per-km was about 223.5 million/km.

Generally IMO, you cannot use Western Australia per-km cost directly as an East-Coast per-km cost. Projects on the Australian East Coast tend to cost 2x whatever is done in Perth on a per-km basis, so you would need to adjust figures upwards when producing a corresponding East Coast value.

Current patronage on the line is running at an average of 401,699 boardings per month. If this continues to the end of the financial year (Transperth uses that as the year-end) the line will see usage hit around 4.8 million boardings. An incredible result for a spur of just 3 stations, set in low density, high car use etc. The trip takes just 18 minutes from Perth station. The comparable car trip is about 20 minutes.

The other thing is that the PTA decided to place a station at the Airport fringe, called Redcliffe. This is about 500 m from DFO Perth, Woolworths Perth Airport etc. Building a Skygate station at Brisbane Airport/DFO might not be a bad idea after all.

Notes

Transperth Transport Performance (Airport Line)
https://www.pta.wa.gov.au/about-us/priorities-and-performance/transport-performance#Airport-Line-530

What You Should Know about Megaprojects and Why: An Overview [This is a summary of a full paper]
Bent Flyvbjerg, Oxford University, UK
Project Management Institute (PMI) (2014)
URL: https://www.pmi.org/-/media/pmi/documents/public/pdf/research/research-summaries/flyvbjerg_megaprojects.pdf

The PMI is a project management society responsible for worldwide PMP certification, and accreditation of project management degree courses at universities.

QuoteThis controversial, yet profound, paper challenges the prevailing wisdom relevant to mega- project management. Flyvbjerg presents strong evidence showing how megaprojects usually unfold. He identifies four causes or "sublimes" that explain the increase in size and frequency of this extremely large kind of project. Namely, political, technological, economical and aesthetic drivers seduce decision makers to underestimate hidden risks, and to overestimate benefits.

He also denounces a "break-fix" model which explains the "iron law of megaprojects": Over budget, over time, over and over again. Furthermore, he presents evidence against current theories, responsible for an inverted Darwinism, where the "unfittest" project is selected and funded over better-fitted ones. Consequently, many megaprojects can be characterized as "disasters waiting to happen."

^ Sober reading. There is a table at the following link:

The Iron Law of Megaprojects
Over budget, over time, under benefits, over and over again
https://towardsdatascience.com/the-iron-law-of-megaprojects-18b886590f0b

Three projects in the list given are HSR projects, and as we know, since publication, one could add HS2 and California HSR to these lists.

QuoteThe Perth to Mandurah railway, described as one of the most forward-thinking pieces of infrastructure development in the area for years, is expected to begin passenger services before Christmas 2007, five months behind its originally scheduled opening.

QuoteHowever, after a number of delays and with a final cost of AU$1.66bn, the project has suffered seven individual cost blow-outs, amounting to a 17% hike on the initial budget first set back in 2002.

So with Perths rail system, is some degree of cost escalation ok if it means you get a good network?

Review

Just another government bus service? (Do proper incentives achieve as much as privatisation?)
John W. Dudgeon
Director of Planning & Research, Department of Transport
Brisbane City Council,  Australia
13th Australasian Transport Research Forum, Christchurch, New Zealand, 18-21 July 1988;
Forum papers. Volume 1 and 2

URL: https://australasiantransportresearchforum.org.au/just-another-government-bus-service/
TRB Citation: https://trid.trb.org/view/309829

Quote from: AbstractPrivatisation has been used by governments in the United Kingdom and the United States of America as a policy, amongst other things, to decrease the cost of providing transport services. Essentially it is assumed that privatisation will provide proper incentives so that transport monopolies/bureaucracies are forced to become efficient and effective.

Brisbane City Council operates the public bus and ferry system in Queensland's capital. This paper describes the political and social environment within which the system operates. Unlike other capital city public transport systems in Australia the level of deficit is an election issue and the level of state government subsidy is dependent on the farebox receipts. A range of performance measures - especially in the marketing innovation area - are examined to assess whether these efficiency/effectiveness incentives have resulted in achievements similar to those claimed for privatisation.

This paper is key to understanding how we got to where we are today.

Back in the day, it appears that in addition to all bus and ferry being in-house, BCC also had the power to set fares and make network changes. Later when cars became common, the dramatic fall in revenue and patronage necessitated State Government subsidy and route change approval. Patronage fell 10% in one year, for example.

For these reasons, CityCat and ferry services are contracted from BCC and not directly from Translink. This is a historical thing.

QuoteOfficers concluded that fare prices alone were not a great factor in stopping the drift to the motor vehicle. Forced interchanges were found to be impractical. They were not acceptable to choice travellers in a low frequency transit system in a city the size of Brisbane.

So, Council already knows that fare cuts do not shift mode share much. At best they would encourage existing users to take more trips, but that won't translate to less driving. It was true then, and it probably still is true now. As for interchanges, off-peak train services are more frequent now on most but not all lines.

Paper goes on to cover the following areas:

- CityXpress bus network (BCC cut out most stops, ran 30 minute clockface timetable)
- The Great Circle Line (BCC ran the route in segments, extending over time until the circle closed when the Gateway Bridge was completed)
- CityPrecincts Express (5 service peak hour rocket that stopped at CBD precincts)
- Queen Street Bus Station built to compensate for the loss of surface bus stops when the Queen Street Mall was built.
- CityLimited a failed forerunner to today's BUZ service.

The free CityLoop is also covered.

When BCC operated trams, until 1968, the basic frequency was every 12 minutes and not 15 minutes. This carried over to bus services for a time after trams were removed. There are tram timetables elsewhere on the RBOT site.

This eventually became watered-down to 15 and 30 minutes.

QuoteA concept called CityLimited was developed as a halfway version between Cityxpress and Citybus. The concept was to eliminate about every second bus stop on a major bus route, reduce the off-peak frequency from twelve to a "clockface" fifteen minutes, and use the airconditioned buses as a marketing reward. Bus stop information was to be supplied at every stop.

Image: CityXpress Bus Route Map, which mirrors the BUZ network in place today.

Review

A South-East Queensland Transit Authority: Transport Planning And Coordination Amendment Bill 1995
Legislation Bulletin 7/95
David Thannhauser, Queensland Parliamentary Library, Brisbane.
November 1995.

URL: https://documents.parliament.qld.gov.au/explore/ResearchPublications/LegislationBulletins/lb0795dt.pdf



About 17 years before then Premier Campbell Newman entered office, the fate of TransLink Mk I was already foreshadowed in this text of a 1995 Queensland Parliamentary discussion paper.

Quote from: Thannhauser (1995)In summing up the lessons which the demise of the MTA might have for similar coordinating bodies, John Minnery has warned that organisations created with charters that effectively restrict the powers of pre-existing agencies will be resisted and that their jurisdictional limits and powers must be developed and clearly defined or they may have to struggle for their very existence.11

^ In other words, the fate of Translink MkI was already sealed before either it came into existence or then Premier Campbell Newman came to office. John Minnery, who appears to have been a planning academic at UQ, properly recognised the situational aspect to the issue.

The discussion paper also sets out the initial co-ordination attempt that led to the creation of the MTA:

- In 1970 Wilbur Smith and Associates Study suggests an overall transport co-ordination body (unclear if this is just PT or both PT and roads)
- In 1970, the Metropolitan Transit Project Policy Committee was formed. The QLD Treasurer, the Minister for Transport, Brisbane's Lord Mayor, The Coordinator-General and the Under Treasurer are members of the committee.
- In 1974, The MTPPC sub-committee was reconstituted as the Metropolitan Transit Project Board
- In 1976, Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) is formed under an Act bearing its name.
- In 1984, PA Management Consultants is commissioned by the Transport Minister to produce a report into the MTA. Their report is here.
- In 1985, the MTA is abolished.

The MTA had essentially the same responsibilities as TransLink MkI (properly integrated and efficient system of public passenger transport):

Quote from: Thannhauser (1995)2.2 THE FORMER METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY

The Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) existed from 1974 to 1985. It has since been claimed that the MTA "was not in practice an effective coordinating body".(4) There is a perception, referred to in the Minister's Second Reading Speech, that a SEQ transit authority, such as the Bill proposes, may come and go the same way the MTA did.(5) The Minister stated, however, that he believed that, in light of the culture surrounding it, the MTA had been "ahead of its time".(6) The primary objective of the MTA was the provision of a "properly integrated and efficient system of public passenger transport".7

(Bold added)

Significance

Mr Minnery identified the situational aspect to setting up a PT Authority, and well ahead of time accurately predicted its fate. The current 'diluted' form of Translink (essentially a TMR brand) exists because that is what works for the "pre-existing agencies" Mr Minnery speaks of.

A Public Transport Authority set up as a co-ordinating body that seeks to fill in the gaps between existing PT agencies appears unlikely to work for the reasons set out above. There are now two cases in Queensland where setting it up as a co-ordinating body between existing agencies has not worked.

The obvious alternative (not necessarily suggesting this) is for a Public Transport Authority to be set up as a singular authority like the WA Public Transport Authority (Transperth) and incorporate the pre-existing agencies into the Authority as subsidiary divisions. Co-ordination is achieved by only having one set of managers run the show.

Engineers Australia Thought Leaders Series: Brisbane Metro - Smart Infrastructure Planning
The Thought Leaders Series is a unique platform for Engineers Australia's industry partners to showcase innovations and thought leadership across engineering.

Henry Unwin FIEAUst CPEng
Brisbane Metro – Infrastructure Design and Assurance Principal Project Manager, BCC

Cory Moorhead
Brisbane Metro – Metro Depot Principal Project Manager, BCC


Some notes:

- Adelaide Street tunnels. Driven tunnel with canopy tubes over the tunnel, 2 x 3.5 m wide lanes. Tunnel is 1.5 m below Telstra utilities in parts.

- Gradients. Major factor in choosing BRT mode was steep gradients. This seems to have ruled out LRT. Parts of the existing network already have gradients of 10%, for example coming out of King George Square. During performance testing at Mt Coo-tha Quarry, the BRT vehicle was able to exceed > 10% gradient, fully loaded.

- Electric charging. 600 kW fast chargers (6 min), 50 kW slow chargers (overnight at depot).

- Turning circle of the Hess Brisbane Metro bus is less than the equivalent radius than for existing BCC 14.5 m buses.

- Already in use overseas. BRT vehicles in use in Europe already – France (Nantes) and Switzerland.

Olympic Proportions: Cost and Cost Overrun at the Olympics 1960-2012
Saïd Business School Working Papers, University of Oxford.

Last revised: 21 Jan 2014
Bent Flyvbjerg
University of Oxford - Said Business School; IT University of Copenhagen; St Anne's College, University of Oxford

Allison Stewart
University of Oxford; University of Oxford - Said Business School

URL: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2238053 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2238053

QuoteAbstract (Excerpt)
Do different types of megaprojects have different cost overruns? This apparently simple question is at the heart of research at the University of Oxford aimed at understanding the characteristics of megaprojects, particularly in terms of how they are established, run and concluded.

In this study, we set out to investigate cost overruns in the Olympic Games. To do so, we examined the costs of the Games over half a century, including both summer and winter Olympics. We looked at the evolution of final reported costs and compared these to the costs established in the Games bids, submitted to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) up to seven years before the Games occurred. In so doing we established the largest dataset of its kind, and documented for the first time in a consistent fashion the costs and cost overruns for the Olympic Games, from 1960 to 2012.

We discovered that the Games stand out in two distinct ways compared to other megaprojects: (1) The Games overrun with 100 per cent consistency. No other type of megaproject is this consistent regarding cost overrun. Other project types are typically on budget from time to time, but not the Olympics. (2) With an average cost overrun in real terms of 179 per cent – and 324 per cent in nominal terms – overruns in the Games have historically been significantly larger than for other types of megaprojects, including infrastructure, construction, ICT, and dams. The data thus show that for a city and nation to decide to host the Olympic Games is to take on one of the most financially risky type of megaproject that exists, something that many cities and nations have learned to their peril.

Some notes:

- Always overran its budget (at least during the study window)
- Cost: Summer Games > Winter Games (exception - Sochi)
- Average cost overrrun ~ 160% (observation - this is close to the 1.8x factor for Queensland Government megaprojects)
- Only direct costs are considered, contingent costs (e.g. transport infrastructure etc) are not included in this analysis.

Regression to the tail: Why the Olympics blow up
Bent Flyvbjerg, Alexander Budzier, and Daniel Lunn
Volume 53, Issue 2
https://doi.org/10.1177/0308518X20958724

QuoteAbstract
The Olympic Games are the largest, highest-profile, and most expensive megaevent hosted by cities and nations. Average sports-related costs of hosting are $12.0 billion. Non-sports-related costs are typically several times that. Every Olympics since 1960 has run over budget, at an average of 172 percent in real terms, the highest overrun on record for any type of megaproject. The paper tests theoretical statistical distributions against empirical data for the costs of the Games, in order to explain the cost risks faced by host cities and nations. It is documented, for the first time, that cost and cost overrun for the Games follow a power-law distribution. Olympic costs are subject to infinite mean and variance, with dire consequences for predictability and planning. We name this phenomenon "regression to the tail": it is only a matter of time until a new extreme event occurs, with an overrun larger than the largest so far, and thus more disruptive and less plannable. The generative mechanism for the Olympic power law is identified as strong convexity prompted by six causal drivers: irreversibility, fixed deadlines, the Blank Check Syndrome, tight coupling, long planning horizons, and an Eternal Beginner Syndrome. The power law explains why the Games are so difficult to plan and manage successfully, and why cities and nations should think twice before hosting. Based on the power law, two heuristics are identified for better decision making on hosting. Finally, the paper develops measures for good practice in planning and managing the Games, including how to mitigate the extreme risks of the Olympic power law.

Notes

- Study does a deep-dive statistical analysis of costs and overruns for the Olympics.
- Interestingly, the fixed and well-defined nature of the games seems to increase the risk rather than decrease it, because compromises cannot be made that would offset the cost or risk of overruns.

This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) which permits any use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages (https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage).

Transport Planning for the XII Commonwealth Games Brisbane 1982
Denis Johnston (Consultant) and Dongjoo Park (Metropolitan Transit Authority) (1980)
Pages 529-549
URL https://australasiantransportresearchforum.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/1980_Johnston_Park.pdf

Quote from: AbstractTransport planning for the 1982 Commonwealth Games to be held in Brisbane involves many representatives from the three tiers of government and from private industry. The aim of this paper is to outline the scale and nature of transport problems which are being faced in planning for 1982. The XII Commonwealth Games Foundation realises that well planned transport usually goes unnoticed.
 
Hopefully, this paper will indicate the extent to which the many authorities, committed to games transport planning, have gone in order for transport to remain unnoticed in 1982. Unlike traditional approaches to transport problems, planning for a special "one-off" event such as the games has to address many peculiar demands which are, to a large extent, completely unfamiliar to the host city concerned. The XII Games will place a sudden and abnormally high demand upon all forms of transport infrastructure. Not only do preparations need to be made for the many thousands of spectators, but also for the specialised requirements of the many VIPs, officials, competitors and personnel directly concerned with the XII Commonwealth Games Foundation.

Comments
- Significant demand created for opening and closing ceremonies.
- Car was not an option due to the enormous congestion that would be created, obstruction of bus services, and land required for parking.

Strategies
- Scheduling events so that spectators were discharged outside of the peak hour
- Shifting school holiday periods so that there was less traffic
- Temporary P&R facilities were created (15,000 car spaces) with shuttle buses operating between the temporary P&R facilities and the games venue
- Special rail services put on, with ~ 100 shuttle buses put on to ferry passengers to the stadium
- Road closures, bus priority treatments

 

Donald Frederick (Don) Lane
Former Queensland Minister for Transport
In Office 24 Jul 1971 - 30 Jan 1989 [LIB, NP, IND]

URL: Queensland Parliament https://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/Members/Former-Members/Former-Members-Register/Former-Member-Details?id=1758941985

URL: Donald Frederick (Don) Lane (1935–1995) by Brian F. Stevenson https://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/lane-donald-frederick-don-27836

URL: Obituary Australia https://oa.anu.edu.au/obituary/lane-donald-frederick-don-27836

Going by the below accounts, Minister Lane was an influential and competent QLD Minister of Transport with the backing of an independent transit agency, the Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA).

QuoteAdditional Information (Abridged)
Mr Lane was awarded a Queen's Commendation for bravery for disarming a man shooting at a fellow officer. During his time as minister, Mr Lane introduced the state's mainland rail electrification; constructed the Brisbane Transit Centre and the interstate railway across the Brisbane River; constructed new railway stations at Boondall, Carseldine, Bray Park, Birkdale, Thornside and Albion; and personally secured federal and state funds to expand the electrified rail system to Caboolture

QuoteAppointed as minister for transport in December 1980, Lane proved to be confident, capable, and effective in the portfolio. He championed the ambitious Main Line Electrification project, approved in 1983. School crossing traffic wardens ('lollipop people') were introduced at his instigation (1983). Construction of the Brisbane Transit Centre in Roma Street, begun in 1984, was another of his projects, as was the introduction of photographic drivers' licences (1986). He oversaw (1982) the reduction of the legal blood alcohol level for drivers and the introduction (1986) of the Reduce Impaired Driving scheme of random breath-testing. In 1986 he claimed to have saved the railways '$25 million a year initially and another $15 million a year ongoing' (Stewart 1986, 12), the efficiencies contributing to an operating profit of $108 million in the previous financial year. Sir Llew Edwards, the State treasurer in 1978–83, later said Lane was the best transport minister Queensland had ever had.

QuoteAs Transport Minister he was an effective, capable and worldly administrator not one to be gullible or fall victim to bureaucratic ploys, but able to establish direction and nurture major projects.

Like many Queensland ministers he had an informal style that attracted dedication and loyalty. He got some grudging recognition from the Opposition Labor Party for his political and administrative skills.

(Bold added)

Interesting site to show transport modes share across the world

https://x.com/fuckcarsreddit/status/1778135838762664014?s=46&t=EDszjTErsxTIqAna7yuP-w

https://citiesmoving.com/visualizations/

Interesting to see the grey dots showing that Australian cities are pretty bad but not quite American standard.

https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/we-need-to-make-cities-less-car-dependent/

QuoteWe Need to Make Cities Less Car-Dependent

Reducing the need for car travel is better for health, the environment and public safety

In the 1970s a nation confronted a crisis of traffic deaths, many of them deaths of children. Protesters took to the streets to fight an entrenched culture of drivers who considered roads their domain alone. But this wasn't the U.S.—it was the Netherlands. In 1975 the rate of traffic deaths there was 20 percent higher than in the U.S., but by the mid-2000s it had fallen to 60 percent lower than in the U.S. How did this happen? ...

https://x.com/hot_rails/status/1777584817879597285?s=46&t=EDszjTErsxTIqAna7yuP-w

https://t.co/flS1LtO6QE

QuoteIt has long been recognised – at least as far back as 1988, during planning for the Channel Tunnel – that the market share achieved by a rail service against an airline serving the same route can be modelled simply as a function of the duration of the train journey. What's less often appreciated is the universality of this model. It is applicable in every scenario – fast trains or slow, long-distance or short, big city or small, even rich world or poor. It's practically a law of physics – and therefore an important and useful tool in the discussion of improved passenger rail services.

Previous studies of this type have mostly been limited either in the absolute number, or the geographic distribution of their samples, or have focused only on high-speed services. While not taking anything away from their validity, they have therefore have failed to highlight the universal applicability of the relationship. This is what we hope to address with our review, the largest and most comprehensive study of its type ever published. Our sample currently includes 219 datapoints covering 133 unique city-pairs across six continents. The criteria for inclusion is simple – if a rail service has (or had) a competitive air route, and we could find either patronage or market share data for the train service, it was included. We limited the sample to trains taking 15 hours or less – about the limit for a practical one-day (or night) train.

Nice data & analysis Jonno Thanks for sharing this.

It just further supports the idea of a relative time equivalence principle.

A 4-5 hour trip would give break-even mode share (50%). Might not need HSR after all

It sort of indicates that SYD-CBR would be in striking distance.

In principle it should also be possible to construct these mode share curves for ordinary suburban and regional train services vs car, or at least estimate these.

Rail's market share against air: A global review

https://hotrails.net/2024/04/rails-market-share-against-air-a-global-review/

Quote from: #Metro on April 20, 2024, 09:41:51 AMNice data & analysis Jonno Thanks for sharing this.

It just further supports the idea of a relative time equivalence principle.

A 4-5 hour trip would give break-even mode share (50%). Might not need HSR after all

It sort of indicates that SYD-CBR would be in striking distance.

In principle it should also be possible to construct these mode share curves for ordinary suburban and regional train services vs car, or at least estimate these.

To me it is just further evidence that the Predict and Provide Models are utterly and completely broken.

Jonno, the curve you presented is a model too.

No it's the result of a survey! That's not modeling!

Well Jonno, does the line of best fit have an equation that describes it? Yes.

Can this line based on past data be used to make predictions/projections about future projects? Yes

Therefore, it's a model.

Congrats on your first quantitative model 

Infrastructure Australia Project Evaluation of the WA PTA Yanchep Extension (2018)
URL: https://www.infrastructureaustralia.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-06/Project-Evaluation-Summary-METRONET-YRE_0.pdf

- First assessed by IA in 2018
- 14.5 km of new rail extension off the existing Joondalup line, starting from Butler
- 3 new train stations
- 1000 space P&R parking bays at each of the 3 new train stations
- Mode-choice analysis assessed LRT, BRT and HR

The BCR in 2018 was 2.6; a very good result considering this was using the more difficult 7% discount rate.

The project was initially costed at about $531.7 ($2017). Inflation adjusted to 2023 figures, this is $642.89 (RBA Inflation Calculator). Project experienced a cost blow out, ending at $1.08b.

That said, the BCR was well positive and the unit cost even with the blown out figures in the end came to just $74.48 million/km which IMO is excellent value ($1080 million/14.5 km rail).





Notes

RBA Inflation Calculator
https://www.rba.gov.au/calculator/annualDecimal.html

Infrastructure Australia Project Evaluation Summary
https://www.infrastructureaustralia.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-06/Project-Evaluation-Summary-METRONET-YRE_0.pdf

First test run for $1.08b Metronet Yanchep rail extension marks major milestone after years of delays
https://thewest.com.au/travel/trains/first-test-run-for-18b-metronet-yanchep-rail-extension-marks-major-milestone-after-years-of-delays-c-12989954

QuoteThe project was initially costed at about $531.7 ($2017). Inflation adjusted to 2023 figures, this is $642.89 (RBA Inflation Calculator). Project experienced a cost blow out, ending at $1.08b.

So about 1.8 

AAA Transport Affordability Index

https://data.aaa.asn.au/transport-affordability/

====

InQueensland --> Transport continues to cost us a fortune, but that's no brake on buying bigger rigs

QuoteAustralian households spend more than $450 a week on private transport – and as much as $563 in one capital city – as prices in the sector continue to rise, a report shows. ...

The Oxford Olympics Study 2024: Are Cost and Cost Overrun at the Games Coming Down?
Alexander Budzier and Bent Flyvbjerg, University of Oxford - Saïd Business School
URL: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4850085

Pretty blunt assessment here "Cost overruns are the norm for the Games, past, present, and future; they are the only project type that never delivered on budget, ever."

Even more interesting is that recycling existing infrastructure does not necessarily avoid cost overruns either.   

QuoteAbstract
The present paper is an update of the "The Oxford Olympics Study 2016" (Flyvbjerg et al. 2016). We document that the Games remain costly and continue to have large cost overruns, to a degree that threatens their viability. The IOC is aware of the problem and has initiated reform. We assess the reforms and find: (a) Olympic costs are statistically significantly increasing; prior analyses did not show this trend; it is a step in the wrong direction. (b) Cost overruns were decreasing until 2008, but have increased since then; again a step in the wrong direction. (c) At present, the cost of Paris 2024 is USD 8.7 billion (2022 level) and cost overrun is 115% in real terms; this is not the cheaper Games that were promised. (d) Cost overruns are the norm for the Games, past, present, and future; they are the only project type that never delivered on budget, ever.

We assess a new IOC policy of reducing cost by reusing existing venues instead of building new ones. We find that reuse did not have the desired effect for Tokyo 2020 and also looks ineffective for Paris 2024. Finally, we recommend that the Games look to other types of megaprojects for better data, better forecasting, and how to generate the positive learning curves that are necessary for bringing costs and overrun down. Only if this happens are Los Angeles 2028 and Brisbane 2032 likely to live up to the IOC's intentions of a more affordable Games that more cities will want to host.

Keywords: Olympic Games, Olympics, Sports, Cost, Cost overrun, Paris 2024

Paper on the sudden closure of the Riverside Expressway and impact on travel behaviour (and train patronage).

The Closure of Brisbane's Riverside Expressway - How people changed their travel behaviour
Paolo Marinelli, Viki Watson 
Queensland Department of Transport and Main Roads, Brisbane, Qld, Australia
Conference Paper, Australian Transport Research Forum (2009)

URL: https://australasiantransportresearchforum.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/2009_Marinelli_Watson.pdf
"The views expressed in this paper are those of authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Queensland Department of Transport and Main Roads or the Queensland Government."

QuoteABSTRACT
The closure of one of Queensland's busiest roads – Brisbane's Riverside Expressway – had a major effect on the city road network with traffic increases on major arterials within one kilometre of the Brisbane CBD.  Beyond that, affects tailed off quickly. Public transport patronage increased by approximately 8 per cent during the closure with the majority moving to train. Overall 29 per cent of people in Greater Brisbane reported some affect on them – either positive or negative. However, in many northern suburbs of Brisbane, where a large scale (70,000 household) voluntary travel behaviour change program had just been completed, only 14 per cent of people reported any affect on them. Despite being less affected by the closure they were more likely to switch modes, mainly from car to public transport.

Uniqueness Bias: Why It Matters, How to Curb It (Working Paper, under review)
Bent Flyvbjerg, Alexander Budzier, M. D. Christodoulou, and M. Zottoli University of Oxford IT University of Copenhagen. August 2024.
URL: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2408.07710

QuoteAbstract

The paper explores "uniqueness bias," a behavioral bias defined as the tendency of planners and managers to see their decisions as singular. For the first time, uniqueness bias is correlated with forecasting accuracy and performance in real-world project investment decisions. We problematize the conventional framing of projects as unique and hypothesize that it leads to poor project performance. We test the thesis for a sample of 219 projects and find that perceived uniqueness is indeed highly statistically significantly associated with underperformance. Finally, we identify how decision makers can mitigate uniqueness bias in their projects through what Daniel Kahneman aptly called "decision hygiene," specifically reference class forecasting, premortems, similarity-based forecasting, and noise audits.

The latest research (pre-print) from Bent Flyvbjerg, University of Oxford addresses 'uniqueness bias'.

"But that's not comparable" is the sort of response that comes to mind when thinking about this.

But something does not need to be identical to be similar or comparable.

The key finding here is the authors find that perceptions of project uniqueness correlate directly with poor project performance.

Northwest T-Way (Sydney, NSW)
Australian National Construction Major Project Review Magazine (2008)
Leighton Contractors
URL: https://ancr.com.au/Northwest_T_Way.pdf

This feature article by Leighton Contractors on the Northwest T-Way appeared in the Australian National Construction Review Magazine.

Overall the project consisted of 24 km
- 21 km of exclusive Priority A busway
- 3 km of bus lanes
- 30 bus stations
- 2 P&R with 400 car spaces (in total)
- Seven new bridges and three underpasses
- 3m wide shared pedestrian path and cycle way was built along the entire length
of the T-way.

Cost was about $542 million for 24 km and 30 stops/stations, or 22 million/km (2004 dollars). In today's dollars about $36.3 million/km.

QuoteIn December 2004 the NSW Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW RTA) awarded Leighton Contractors the contract to design, construct and maintain a $524 million transit way development for a rapid bus service linking Parramatta, Blacktown and Rouse Hill.

The North-West T-way, or T-way, would link existing bus and rail networks, including the recently completed Paramatta-Liverpool T-way. Former NSW Premier Bob Carr envisaged the T-way would provide Sydney's North West residents with increased access to "jobs, health, education and leisure facilities", reduced travelling times and reduced car congestion on existing roads.

The NW T-way project was not very successful. Patronage was weak and the NSW government scrapped the bus priority traffic signalling that was planned originally. Parts of the cycleway were not completed, unsafe, or diverged from the T-way significantly.

It was easier to build because much of it was built through suburbs which were early in the stages of redevelopment from low density semi-rural into fully built out suburbs.

A project like this could maybe be applied in the same way to Caboolture, Ripley, or FlagstoneThough as I say the original iteration was a bit of a failure and not well received.

Nine public transit lessons from Perth
Darren Davis | September 25, 2024

URL: https://www.greaterauckland.org.nz/2024/09/25/nine-public-transit-lessons-from-perth/

1. Public transport for everyone
2. Accessible public transport
3. A focus on simplicity and legibility
4. A focus on frequency

QuoteFor example, entire Perth rail network runs at least every 15 minutes all day, every day of the week and at a significant number of stations on the legacy lines served by two lines, this further improves to a train every 7.5 minutes, all day every day of the week.

QuoteAnd it's not only trains but buses that deliver frequency in Perth. The high-frequency bus network does a lot of frequent heavy lifting in non-rail served parts of Perth. There are 15 high-frequency 900 series bus routes in Perth. These services run at least every 15 minutes between 7am and 7pm on weekdays, 8am and 7pm on Saturdays, and 9am and 7pm on Sundays.

^ Trains all run frequently all day, even on weekends, something not yet achieved in Brisbane. In areas where there isn't rail, the bus runs frequently along main road corridors. Something only partially achieved in Brisbane.

5. A focus on speed

QuoteVisible public transport speed, particularly speed visible to car drivers stuck on congested barely moving motorways, is some of the best free self-marketing for public transport around. And Perth has this with the Yanchep Line running in the median of the Mitchell Freeway and the Mandurah Line running in the median of the Kwinana Freeway.

QuoteThis is supported by high speeds on the newer lines on the Perth rail network – the Airport, Yanchep and Mandurah lines – which each have a top speed of 130 kilometres per hour and wide station spacing. The legacy lines – Armadale, Thornlie and Midland – have a top speed of 100 kilometres per hour while the Fremantle line has a top speed of 90 kilometres per hour.

^ A very important thing is how to speed up the QR network. Railways tend to slow down over time so as to maintain the reliability metric. In a world where motorway upgrades make cars faster, particularly in the off-peak, it is very important to keep average train speed fast.

And if that means running the train down the middle or side of a freeway, then so be it.

6. A focus on safety
7. A focus on presentation
8. An integrated network
9. No irritating train announcements

Conclusion

QuotePerth has transitioned from a poor public transport performer three decades ago to third place in Australia in public transport patronage per capita. This is because it has acknowledged that it is working with a very sprawly, low-density, car-oriented city to make public transport work for that context.

(Bolding added).

 

Notes

PT per capita patronage - note the position of Greater Brisbane, second last after Adelaide.

Once again you love cherry picking specific public transport problems with reasons that don't actually apply. For example. Buses run frequently along mains roads. Outside of the 3 buz services (330/340/345) and the 680 name buses that run more frequently than 59 minutes between Petrie-Chermside-Albany Creek-Nudgee? Why does my weekend bus have a 2 hourly frequency? If someone wants to get home quickly at night why does the 350 City-Aspley bus via Bridgeman Downs divert and runs well out of the way to Albany Creek after 7pm? Why not address bus routing problems? Why not address network issues? Why not address station access issues (why do stations only have 1 access point when it can clearly have multiple access points and reduce excessive walking (take Woolloowin. You should be able to access the platform from the street but you have to walk 100m up the hill to the station overpass and then walk back down the ramp to where you just were. This applies to lots and lots of stations across the network).

Why not look at interchange issues? Why do some buses in Brisbane arrive at train station after 9am? Why do some buses stop going to/from bus stations at 6pm? Why do buses stop running in general after 6pm?

Give it a rest HTG.

Quote from: #Metro on October 06, 2024, 12:59:18 PMGive it a rest HTG.

Just calling out the bs   So do you want to address the fundamental issues with our network or do you just want to side step and dodge all the issues because Perth has freeway running and 4tph?

Give it a rest HTG.

The same can be said for you if you keep wanting to post bs

Policy Guidelines
Trackless Trams: An Emerging Transformative Opportunity
Journal of City Climate Policy and Economy. Volume 2 Issue 2, January 2024, pp. 241-250.
Peter Newman, Professor of Sustainability at Curtin University, Western Australia.
URL https://jccpe.utpjournals.press/doi/full/10.3138/jccpe-2023-0005

QuoteAbstract
Trackless trams are a Chinese innovation that provide net zero opportunities, which are also transformative for cities. They have not yet been used outside China. They are battery-based vehicles with sensors that guide them down roads and have rail-like ride quality with potential to carry the equivalent of six lanes of traffic. This means they can enable net zero transformative potential for reducing car dependence while creating urban regeneration opportunities around stations, thus enabling other social and economic benefits for a city. The personal and research story is outlined of how urban leaders, developers and finance groups, are now discovering how trackless trams can be applied to their cities. Issues are being raised that need answers, but the immediate appeal of a new technology that can compete with cars and help provide a net zero transport solution is real. Significant steps forward in certifying this innovative vehicle are happening in 2023 and ongoing policy discussions are starting to resolve how best to demonstrate the technology so it becomes transformative. The opportunity is suggested to create a new model in cities on how to integrate such transit with urban regeneration in net zero corridors, using procurement with partnerships between private investment and public agencies.

QuoteThe Trackless Tram is an innovation from Chinese rail manufacturer CRRC. They took six innovations out of high-speed rail and transformed a bus into a rail-like vehicle through digital guidance which makes these trams cheaper than light rail and enables them to be implemented very simply into main roads, with three or four carriages reducing six lanes of traffic due to their speed (up to 70 km/h) and capacity (see Figure 1).

^ Will be interesting to see the results of the City of Stirling trackless tram trial and what the six innovations from HSR they took out and put in a bus.

Passenger Benefits of Sydney Metro
Neil Douglas (Douglas Economics, New Zealand) and Peter Thornton (Transportation Associates, Australia)
Australasian Transport Research Forum 2019 Proceedings 30 September – 2 October, Canberra, Australia Publication website: http://www.atrf.info

URL: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Neil-Douglas/publication/336533218_The_Passenger_Benefits_of_Sydney_Metro/links/5da4cabf92851c6b4bd6a94c/The-Passenger-Benefits-of-Sydney-Metro.pdf

QuoteAbstract
Transportation Consultant and Civil engineer Peter Thornton debates with transport economist Neil Douglas the benefits of Sydney Metro using the experience of one particular passenger. The dialogue between Peter Thornton and Neil Douglas, explains the contemporary approach of calculating benefits by attaching 'willingness to pay' values to journey attributes such as stations, train fleet, travel time, service frequency, reliability, seating and interchange. Given Peter's engineering and planning interests, the discussion also digresses over some of the construction, operational and network aspects of Sydney Metro.

This paper contains an interesting discussion about the value of time, which is generally set to 40%  of the average hourly earnings. This is a key value that feeds into the BCR calculations for any transport project, be it PT, car or something else.

Quote4. Value of Travel Time Savings

Peter Thornton: My friend says his travel time has been cut from 47 mins to 28 mins, measured from Epping to Milsons Point. How do you value the travel time saving?

Neil Douglas: Time is money Peter! In this example, your Epping commuter saves 19 mins a trip, 38 mins per week-day, 3 hours a week and 150 hours a year! He can use the extra time for leisure, like watching TV, gardening, playing with the kids or he could use it to stay longer at the office. In 1997 a workshop of experts led by John Taplin, recommended that 'private' travel time in Australia by all modes (car, rail, bus etc.) be valued at 40% of average hourly earnings, Rainey (1997). 

In NSW, SRA, RailCorp and Sydney Trains have undertaken surveys of how passengers value travel time. Between 2012 and 2014, TfNSW (with the assistance of Sydney Trains) undertook a survey of car, bus, Light Rail, ferry and rail users. The aim was to test how appropriate the 40% wage rate assumption was. As can be seen from Table 1, the 40% wage rate is appropriate for car travel (perhaps a little low) and is very appropriate for commuting by bus, rail and ferry, Douglas and Jones (2018). For 'other' purpose trips by public transport, the value of time was only around a quarter of the wage rate however.

So for your Epping public transport commuter, his value of time would be $14.98/hr. Now this was in 2013/14 when the surveys were done and as you can see it was exactly 40% of the wage rate.

(bolding added)

Opportunity Cost

What is it? When we say yes to something, we are also saying no to something else. This is what opportunity cost is. Although it can be tricky as, like service frequency, it is intangible, it is essential for analysing policy or drawing informed conclusions from possible choices. And there is quite a bit on it in relation to transport service and planning as shown below.

Importantly, opportunity costs still apply, even when things are presented as 'free'. As the saying goes 'there is no such thing as a free lunch.'

Australian Transport Assessment and Planning
Tools and Techniques > T2 Cost Benefit Analysis > Step 2: Identify the benefits and costs
URL: https://www.atap.gov.au/tools-techniques/cost-benefit-analysis/3-step-2-identify-the-benefits-and-costs

QuoteBox 3: Resource and opportunity costs
The term 'opportunity cost' refers to the benefit that would accrue from using a resource in its next best alternative use. For example, the value of land in CBA (and financial analysis) should be the current market price, not the price paid for it in the past. 'Resource cost' is the opportunity cost of resources used, measured from the point of view of society as a whole.

Opportunity Cost or Cost Benefit?
Cost Management Specialists
URL: https://costms.com.au/opportunity-cost-or-cost-benefit/

QuoteIt started as a discussion about free tram rides in the Melbourne CBD in Victoria, Australia.

Could the revenue foregone be better used to invest in public transport improvements?

Are free tram rides in the CBD the best use of scarce resources?

Opportunity Cost, Benefit or Cost Benefit take an operator's perspective that the cost-benefit of the free tram zone exceeds the benefits of revenue foregone from passengers paying fares. Transport specialists take a community perspective and conclude that the opportunity cost of 'free' tram rides is high & there are better ways to spend scarce public transport funding.

Opportunity Cost Definition and Real World Examples

QuoteLearn the most important concept of economics through the use of real-world scenarios that highlight both the benefits and the costs of decisions. Opportunity cost is a simple yet powerful principle that reveals how to make the best economic decisions possible, and it explains why people make the choices they do.

Opportunity cost in action - bolding added

PTUA opposed to expansion of the Free Tram Zone
3 February 2020

QuotePTUA does not support the Free Tram Zone, due to the problems it causes, including crowding, and the lack of benefits it provides to paying public transport users. We also do not support the Zone being extended.

Data indicates the Free Tram Zone has increased tram usage at the expense of "active" modes (walking and cycling) rather than driving, and appears to have encouraged more people to drive into the City and Docklands, while also resulting in delays due to overcrowding at tram stops.

The money spent on providing the Free Tram Zone would be better spent extending and upgrading services across Melbourne, particularly in the middle and outer suburbs, to provide more people with viable alternatives to car travel.

More details: PTUA's submission to the Free Tram Zone Parliamentary Inquiry (PDF)

Media coverage: Herald Sun 3/2/2020; Rail Express 6/2/2020
Victorian Parliament: Inquiry into Expanding Melbourne's Free Tram Zone

SPACE/TIME MAPPING OF URBAN TRANSIT: Isochrones, Car-dependency and Mode-choice in Melbourne
Authors: Kim Dovey, Ian Woodcock, Lucinda Pike, Milena Duric and Dalibor Duric Melbourne School of Design, University of Melbourne 
State of Australian Cities Conference 2015
URL: https://apo.org.au/node/63273

The authors of this paper do an isochrone-based mapping of Melbourne at various times and also two location based studies. The basic idea is that to get better PT we need to be tracking the mapped areas that are possible to get to in 10, 15, 20, 30 minutes etc (isochrones).

This sort of mapping used to be common but for whatever reason has fallen out of favour. However, it is very important as when you map both the accessible areas for cars versus PT and other modes, you can draw qualitative conclusions about what mode is likely to be chosen by residents in that particular area.

Note - when the authors mean 'faster' in the passage below, I think they are referring to total overall journey time.

QuoteAbstract
Everyday urban life involves multiple choices of transport mode, route path and time budgets as individuals seek to move between places and projects in various parts of any city. In this paper we map the time/space zones of accessibility from any given location (isochrones) as a means to understand the ways we make choices between modes – a space/time phenomenology of everyday mobility. Harvesting data from Google Maps and other internet sources we map four primary transport modes – car, public transport, walking and cycling – and the inevitable mix between them. Within frameworks of transit-oriented development and assemblage theory we seek to understand the morphological and infrastructural conditions under which people may choose public transport and active modes of walking and cycling over the private car. Our case studies are in the suburbs of Melbourne under conditions of high car-dependency and low public transport provision.

This work has several outcomes. It shows some of the prospects and limits of harvesting the emerging range of data sources as a means of mapping capacities for urban mobility. It also demonstrates the power of mapping as a production of urban knowledge in a manner that enables us to gear rigorous urban analysis to the phenomenology of everyday life and transport mode choice. Finally, it is a form of design research in that it tests the ways in which designed infrastructural change can transform the space/time flows of everyday life.

QuoteThe isochrones reflect the everyday phenomenology of mode choice. It is at the point when the public transport isochrones can compete with the car isochrones that the system will begin to move to a more resilient regime. When public transport is the clearly faster mode and can be undertaken in safety and comfort, then we move beyond the car-dependent city.

Regional Rail Services - QLD
Question on Notice  No. 1216  Asked on 13 October 2021  
URL: https://documents.parliament.qld.gov.au/tableoffice/questionsanswers/2021/1216-2021.pdf

MR J LISTER ASKED MINISTER FOR TRANSPORT AND MAIN ROADS (HON M BAILEY)

QUESTION:  Will the Minister provide the annual patronage and government subsidy per passenger trip for direct operating costs for each of the following Queensland Rail services (reported separately for each of the past three financial years (actuals) and the next three financial years (forecasts)) (a) Spirit of Queensland, (b) Spirit of the Outback, (c) Tilt Train, (d) Westlander and (e) Inlander?