Cleveland incident - 31 Jan 2013 IMU 173

[Stillwater]

Initial and knee-jerk attempts to blame the driver at the time the crash occurred proven groundless.

[ozbob]

Initial and knee-jerk attempts to blame the driver at the time the crash occurred proven groundless.

Yes,  as I concluded on the ^ 612 ABC Interview ... it was highly likely what the cause was, I just simply pieced together the available information at the time publicly, media, eyewitnesses etc.  and I am no rocket scientist ....

[ozbob]

Twitter

Robyn Ironside ‏@ironsider

Transport Minister says ATSB report on Cleveland crash ruled out catastrophic brake failure. http://t.co/dSmD2IIMzQ

[ozbob]

Couriermail --> Slippery tracks the cause of Cleveland station train crash, report finds

[ozbob]

Brisbanetimes --> Train crash caused by wet leaves

[ozbob]

Minister for Transport and Main Roads
The Honourable Scott Emerson

Federal investigation rules trains safe

The Newman Government has welcomed the Australian Transport Safety Bureau interim report that rules out catastrophic brake failure as the cause of the train crash at Cleveland station on January 31.

Transport and Main Roads Minister Scott Emerson said the report rejects the brake failure claims made by Rail, Tram and Bus Union Queensland State Secretary Owen Doogan.

"It is disappointing Mr Doogan decided to take matters into his own hands and tell drivers not to operate one-third of city fleet, claiming there had been catastrophic break failure," Mr Emerson said.

"This type of action is politically motivated and not in the best interests of passengers or a proper investigation.

"The preliminary findings identify that 'rail head contamination' - build-up of gum leaves and various oils coupled with light rain falling as the train approached the station, caused the incident.

"The report said the driver's actions were appropriate and did not contribute to the accident.

"Since this incident occurred I have been clear that the ATSB was to inform the government of any fault with these units.

"While the ATSB was satisfied the trains were safe, the interim report identifies a number of actions to be implemented by a working group that includes Queensland Rail, key union representatives and a rail safety risk management consultant."

Mr Emerson engaged the ATSB the day after the accident and requested a preliminary report when it became apparent the full investigation would take several months.

"As well as identifying the cause of the crash the report also identified the need for Queensland Rail to put in place a system to identify, monitor or treat the types of circumstances which led to the crash," he said.

"Despite this incident being caused by an unusual mix of events it is still important that we look at how processes can be improved to eliminate future risk."

To date Queensland Rail has implemented a number of interim actions such as examining the trains involved in wheel slide incidents, adjusting how drivers operate in certain conditions and removing leaves and debris from track areas where wheel slide incidents have occurred.

A link to the report is available at www.atsb.gov.au

[ENDS] 13 March 2013

[Gazza]

Cue Brizcommuter talking about leaf delays on the London Underground. 

[ozbob]

Here is some good leaf wheel slip ...   

[petey3801]

Minister for Transport and Main Roads
The Honourable Scott Emerson

Federal investigation rules trains safe

The Newman Government has welcomed the Australian Transport Safety Bureau interim report that rules out catastrophic brake failure as the cause of the train crash at Cleveland station on January 31.

Transport and Main Roads Minister Scott Emerson said the report rejects the brake failure claims made by Rail, Tram and Bus Union Queensland State Secretary Owen Doogan.

"It is disappointing Mr Doogan decided to take matters into his own hands and tell drivers not to operate one-third of city fleet, claiming there had been catastrophic break failure," Mr Emerson said.

"This type of action is politically motivated and not in the best interests of passengers or a proper investigation.

So, if the units had nothing to do with it Mr Emerson, why have Queensland Rail taken three extra 160/260 units out of service (on top of the two that were involved in the accident), as well as advise drivers that the speed on these units must be less than 50% of road speed when on single yellow signals and a maximum speed of 30km/h at least 150m away from any red signal? (These actions were taken shortly after another set of tests up at Elimbah gave slides of up to 860 meters - That is not what I would call a properly working braking system).

EDIT: This is not to say the conditions had nothing to do with it either, as they obviously did. However, the train can't be completely cleared from fault either, IMO.

[ozbob]

Yes, I wonder if sanding gear might be needed Petey.  They added that to the Siemens units in Melbourne and stopped the skating ...

[colinw]

Um, what is so special about the 160s/260s compared to thousands of trains worldwide with comparable traction & braking systems?  Similar traction & braking are in use all over Europe, often in far worse weather conditions than here.

Is this just QLD being 'special' again?

The reason I query this is simply that there is nothing abnormal about microprocessor controlled traction & braking on trains without sanding equipment. Whole industry has been going that way for years now.

As an aside: when I think about the spin/slide detection & mitigation code in a couple of systems I've worked on, I just cringe.  Beats me how in some cases that stuff gets certified as safety critical and fit for use when it appears that no engineers working on the system even understand it.

[ozbob]

But there is clear evidence that something is failing.  Adding sanding gear to the Siemens units stopped the issue with them ...

Are the units here somehow different, not exactly the same in some way?

[somebody]

Good question colinw.  I wonder the same thing about the Siemens trains.  Sanders is fairly exceptional for a passenger EMU isn't it?

[ozbob]

Sure is, but if they have a problem, fit sanding gear, fix the problem there is clear evidence that adhesion is an issue for some designs.

I listened to the ATSB Head on radio this morning.  He did go on about the benefits of brake shoes on the running surfaces of wheels improving the coefficient of friction because of the constant cleaning effect compared to the new disc brake setups ...

[colinw]

Sanding gear is just a "kludge" to patch the problem & provide a fallback.  If root cause isn't identified then I have no confidence.

And by "root cause" I don't mean "track is slippery" (duh!!!), but rather "what the heck were the microprocessors we insist on sticking between the driver and the wheel/rail interface doing"?

I hope, and expect the ATSB to dig into such details.

Or is this simply a case where the adhesion conditions were such that no train entering the station at normal speed would have been able to stop regardless of brake actions applied?

Maybe best if I stop commenting. Insufficient information as yet.

[ozbob]

http://www.transport.vic.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/44298/Platform-Overruns-Siemens-Nexas-EMU-Connex-Metro-Trains-Melbourne-1-Feb-2009.pdf

Page 69 talks about sanding ...

[ozbob]

http://www.transport.vic.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/44298/Platform-Overruns-Siemens-Nexas-EMU-Connex-Metro-Trains-Melbourne-1-Feb-2009.pdf

Page 69 talks about sanding ...

Yes, something is not right if they need sanding gear to work as designed.

[petey3801]

Sanding gear is just a "kludge" to patch the problem & provide a fallback.  If root cause isn't identified then I have no confidence.

And by "root cause" I don't mean "track is slippery" (duh!!!), but rather "what the heck were the microprocessors we insist on sticking between the driver and the wheel/rail interface doing"?

I hope, and expect the ATSB to dig into such details.

Or is this simply a case where the adhesion conditions were such that no train entering the station at normal speed would have been able to stop regardless of brake actions applied?

Maybe best if I stop commenting. Insufficient information as yet.

I've just had a read through the prelim report, and will reply to both your previous post and this post at once (simply cause i'm too lazy to quote both comments  )

As for what's different about the 160/260s compared to other units around the world? I have no idea. I do know, however, that they perform considerably worse when applying traction and braking effort compared to the rest of the QR fleet (the 220 series units have some problems as well, but nowhere near to the extent of the 160/260s).

Agree that the root cause really does need to be found (and really, should have been found some time back... QR know these units are poor performers in poor weather conditions). Perhaps a sanding gear may help while the root cause is found, but as you say, it shouldn't be used as a full-time solution.

Going by the ATSB report, the slide actually began on the approach to the Cleveland home signal, which is a reasonable distance from the station, on a 70km/h section of track. This track had been used by numerous trains over the course of the morning with no problems identified (problems were encountered at Ormiston, but not on the approach/departure to/from Cleveland).

The driver noticed that the train was not slowing as expected. A minimum brake application followed by a half - way brake application at this location was usually sufficient to slow the train to the required speed

The driver then moved the brake controller to the half way position and then further into the full service brake position. He observed that there was still no appreciable reduction in the train's speed. He then saw that the Cleveland home signal (CD12) was showing a yellow proceed aspect and the associated junction indicator was illuminated, indicating the train was to pass through the turnout into the southern platform.
While the driver's focus remained on trying to slow the train, the train was now about 100m from passing CD12 and about 270m from the turnout. The driver was becoming increasingly concerned as the train rapidly approached the turnout, so he moved the train brake to the emergency position and also applied the park brake before entering the points. The train proceeded through the points at a speed of close to 56 km/h and into the down platform located on the southern side of the station. The speed as the train entered the platform remained close to 56km/h.

Now that tells me that there is some sort of flaw in the WSP system of the 160/260 Class unit, or at the very least, the units involved in the accident. Other trains had been using the same section of track and would have been doing the same speed on approach to the home signal all morning, but they were able to stop... In my personal opinion (which is shared by many other drivers in QR), if it was an EMU on the service, it wouldn't have happened.

[ozbob]

However, fitting sanding gear to EMUs is not as rare as I thought actually.  I started to have a more serious look ..

this is interesting ..

SmartSander Enhancement for Commuter Rail
http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/archive/studies/idea/finalreports/transit/Transit49_Final_Report.pdf

An example:
British Rail Class 377  A Bombardier EMU has sanders ... not sure though if for braking, traction or both ...
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Rail_Class_377

[ozbob]

http://www.couriermail.com.au/news/queensland/slippery-tracks-the-cause-of-cleveland-station-train-crash-report-finds/story-e6freoof-1226595963417

... Queensland Rail has now established a Wheel Rail Interface Working Group, which is looking at "wheel cleansing modification opportunities'' for the 160/260 class trains, and reviewing new rolling stock specifications to ensure "current wheel slip lessons learnt are considered'' ...

[Derwan]

I'm not convinced that environmental issues were the only reason why this crash occurred.

Without laying blame, I have to question the approach speed to Cleveland Station and whether drivers actually take weather conditions into account when approaching a terminus station such as Cleveland.  Perhaps the train was within the speed limit, but given the conditions, should have approached at a slower speed?

I used to live in Cleveland - many years ago - and trains slowed to a crawl long before the station.  Does this no longer happen?

I know that when we drive in wet conditions, we have to slow down sooner and allow longer stopping distances.  I assume similar precautions would be in place for train drivers?

I've always maintained that platform overrun is common - especially in the wet.  It's generally not an issue as the driver can reverse.  The difference here is that there is no margin for error.  The train should have slowed considerably long before it got to the point where the driver said, "Oh sh%t!!"

[Derwan]

I've read the full report now (well - most of it) and I guess it agrees with what I just said.  Environmental factors combined with the lack of mitigating factors (which could just be changed approach speeds).

Regarding the braking for 160/260 trains:

The newer, fully disc-braked and WSP-equipped trains in the Queensland Rail fleet appear
particularly susceptible to wheel slide in conditions of low adhesion and are not fitted with any
device to improve adhesion (aside from the WSP system). Older trains in the fleet are fitted with
wheel tread brakes which 'scrub' the wheel tread each time the brakes are applied which
improves the coefficient of friction between the wheels and the rail.

[somebody]

I've read the full report now (well - most of it) and I guess it agrees with what I just said.  Environmental factors combined with the lack of mitigating factors (which could just be changed approach speeds).

Regarding the braking for 160/260 trains:

The newer, fully disc-braked and WSP-equipped trains in the Queensland Rail fleet appear
particularly susceptible to wheel slide in conditions of low adhesion and are not fitted with any
device to improve adhesion (aside from the WSP system). Older trains in the fleet are fitted with
wheel tread brakes which 'scrub' the wheel tread each time the brakes are applied which
improves the coefficient of friction between the wheels and the rail.

Hmm, so it is saying that tread brakes function as a virtual sanding system.  Interesting.

[ozbob]

Goes on ..

... Many railways around the world have risk control systems to actively monitor and control levels of
adhesion around their networks. These include both the forecasting of where and when low
adhesion may occur (based largely on environmental conditions) and also systems for improving
wheel/rail adhesion that are fitted to the train or applied to the track. In the United Kingdom, where
conditions of low adhesion are a prevalent and well understood problem (particularly in autumn
with leaf contamination of the rails), rail operators are required to have systems to identify and
treat low adhesion 'black spots' in their networks. In addition trains in the UK are fitted with
wheel/rail friction modification systems like automatic sanding (which applies sand or Sandite26 to
the wheel/rail interface to improve adhesion when wheel slip is detected) ...

[ozbob]

Rail Head Treatment Trains

During the Autumn, Network Rail runs a number of Rail Head Treatment Trains (RHTTs). These are used to improve track conditions during the leaf fall season. This is done using a combination of water cannons and the application of sandite (a thick sand based paste that improves adhesion) to the rail surface ...

http://www.flickr.com/groups/rhtt/

==================

Network Rail Railhead Treatment Train

[petey3801]

I'm not convinced that environmental issues were the only reason why this crash occurred.

Without laying blame, I have to question the approach speed to Cleveland Station and whether drivers actually take weather conditions into account when approaching a terminus station such as Cleveland.  Perhaps the train was within the speed limit, but given the conditions, should have approached at a slower speed?

I used to live in Cleveland - many years ago - and trains slowed to a crawl long before the station.  Does this no longer happen?

I know that when we drive in wet conditions, we have to slow down sooner and allow longer stopping distances.  I assume similar precautions would be in place for train drivers?

I've always maintained that platform overrun is common - especially in the wet.  It's generally not an issue as the driver can reverse.  The difference here is that there is no margin for error.  The train should have slowed considerably long before it got to the point where the driver said, "Oh sh%t!!"

To be quite honest, going by the report, the driver did pretty much exactly as I would have (and do, regarding speeds) with regards to speeds and braking points. Up until just after the accident, the speed into Cleveland station on both roads was 25km/h, which started just before the points. Before that, road speed is 70. Basically, when you come along the 80 straight (coasting at 70), you pick up a few km/h due to the downhill grade. Small brake application before LH curve before the station, which is posted at 70, to bring the speed back to 70 or slightly less. There is an old occupational crossing about 150-200m before the home signal for Cleveland (which itself is around 200m from the station, 170m from the points), which is where I start braking, and according to the report, roughly where the driver of the incident train started braking. That gives more than enough time to bring the speed back to 25km/h for the points into the station (and that's only using half service, and it brings you down to 25 quite easily with some room to spare). By the time you pass the signal (around 150-170m from the 25 board) you're generally already down to below 50km/h.
Now, on the incident train, the driver was in full service braking before passing the signal and into emergency braking around the signal/just after the signal, yet from when he first applied the brakes to bring the train down to 25km/h (around 150m before the signal, or thereabouts) until hitting the points (total distance of over 300m), the train had only lost around 14km/h.

To give you a rough idea of how pathetically bad that is, as a general rule of thumb, we enter normal (non-terminal) stations (where speed limits permit) at 60km/h, targetting 40km/h at the middle of the platform (roughly 75m) and stop at the end (platform length is around 150m). That's in half service. So where we would normally stop from 60km/h in 150m in half service, he lost 14km/h (from 70km/h) in emergency in around 300m.

EDIT: Forgot to add, after the accident, the speed into P2 was lowered to 15km/h, with P1 (straight in) left at 25km/h. A couple weeks back, that speed was reduced to a blanket 15km/h for both platforms, before the points. This is the only station to have been treated as such.

[Derwan]

To be quite honest, going by the report, the driver did pretty much exactly as I would have (and do, regarding speeds) with regards to speeds and braking points.

Thanks for your first-hand knowledge Petey.  It's appreciated. 

Just wondering - you say that it's what you would've done.  Do you mean you would've done that in dry conditions?  Would you make any adjustments in wet conditions or are the braking points usually enough even in wet conditions?

it was all over for that train before the 25km/hr anyway and you said you can normally achieve 25km/hr easily. So how does this help? You know what I mean, if you cannot make 25km/hr, how are you going to make 15km/hr?

This is a good point!  I remember reading that there are step-down speeds for the Domestic Airport?  Shouldn't it be the same for Cleveland? 70 to 25 (or 15) seems a huge step.

[petey3801]

I'm not convinced that environmental issues were the only reason why this crash occurred.

Without laying blame, I have to question the approach speed to Cleveland Station and whether drivers actually take weather conditions into account when approaching a terminus station such as Cleveland.  Perhaps the train was within the speed limit, but given the conditions, should have approached at a slower speed?

I used to live in Cleveland - many years ago - and trains slowed to a crawl long before the station.  Does this no longer happen?

I know that when we drive in wet conditions, we have to slow down sooner and allow longer stopping distances.  I assume similar precautions would be in place for train drivers?

I've always maintained that platform overrun is common - especially in the wet.  It's generally not an issue as the driver can reverse.  The difference here is that there is no margin for error.  The train should have slowed considerably long before it got to the point where the driver said, "Oh sh%t!!"

To be quite honest, going by the report, the driver did pretty much exactly as I would have (and do, regarding speeds) with regards to speeds and braking points. Up until just after the accident, the speed into Cleveland station on both roads was 25km/h, which started just before the points. Before that, road speed is 70. Basically, when you come along the 80 straight (coasting at 70), you pick up a few km/h due to the downhill grade. Small brake application before LH curve before the station, which is posted at 70, to bring the speed back to 70 or slightly less. There is an old occupational crossing about 150-200m before the home signal for Cleveland (which itself is around 200m from the station, 170m from the points), which is where I start braking, and according to the report, roughly where the driver of the incident train started braking. That gives more than enough time to bring the speed back to 25km/h for the points into the station (and that's only using half service, and it brings you down to 25 quite easily with some room to spare). By the time you pass the signal (around 150-170m from the 25 board) you're generally already down to below 50km/h.
Now, on the incident train, the driver was in full service braking before passing the signal and into emergency braking around the signal/just after the signal, yet from when he first applied the brakes to bring the train down to 25km/h (around 150m before the signal, or thereabouts) until hitting the points (total distance of over 300m), the train had only lost around 14km/h.

To give you a rough idea of how pathetically bad that is, as a general rule of thumb, we enter normal (non-terminal) stations (where speed limits permit) at 60km/h, targetting 40km/h at the middle of the platform (roughly 75m) and stop at the end (platform length is around 150m). That's in half service. So where we would normally stop from 60km/h in 150m in half service, he lost 14km/h (from 70km/h) in emergency in around 300m.

EDIT: Forgot to add, after the accident, the speed into P2 was lowered to 15km/h, with P1 (straight in) left at 25km/h. A couple weeks back, that speed was reduced to a blanket 15km/h for both platforms, before the points. This is the only station to have been treated as such.

Thanks Petey for that detail, helps explain alot.

Now you said the 25km/hr was replaced with a 15km/hr speed board, but going by your information, it was all over for that train before the 25km/hr anyway and you said you can normally achieve 25km/hr easily. So how does this help? You know what I mean, if you cannot make 25km/hr, how are you going to make 15km/hr?

Thanks for your first-hand knowledge Petey.  It's appreciated.

No worries. I completely agree with you regarding the speed reduction, if you can't control the train from 70km/h, it really doesn't matter if it's 25, 15 or 5! It's still not gonna happen! Personally, I think it was a knee-jerk reaction so they could say they did something.

Just wondering - you say that it's what you would've done.  Do you mean you would've done that in dry conditions?  Would you make any adjustments in wet conditions or are the braking points usually enough even in wet conditions?

In the case of Cleveland and it's braking marks, the marks that I use are generally enough in wet conditions as well as dry. If I have had a few braking issues with the unit beforehand, I might add a little bit more, but even then, the normal mark leaves plenty of room for a bit of slip slide, as well as the possibility of putting in a bit more braking effort if needed.

I remember reading that there are step-down speeds for the Domestic Airport?  Shouldn't it be the same for Cleveland? 70 to 25 (or 15) seems a huge step.

To be honest, the stepping down out at the Airport is really quite annoying. Especially at Domestic. The track/signal/speed layout for International to Domestic (outbound) is:

International station
Starter signal, 100km/h board
(3/4 or so along the straight to Dom): 60 board
Signal with Junction Indicator (2 aspect - Yellow or red)
X50 for points
Points (after the points, both tracks are the same layout)
50 board
40 board with signal (2 aspect - Yellow or Red. When not yellow, will show flashing yellow)
25 board before platform
AWS magnet just before platform (procedures across QR is max 20km/h across AWS magnet when the signal is showing red. Also max 20km/h 150m [approx. length of platform] from a dead end)
Domestic station

Now, the reason for the 60 board before the signal protecting the crossover is this:
When a signal with JIs is showing a turnout indication and the turnout is more than 20km/h slower than the mainline/straight track speed, the signals in advance of the crossover will be:
- 3 aspect signalling area:
- Green
- Yellow
- Yellow with JI (which may clear on approach where possible)

-4 aspect signalling area:
- Green
- Double Yellow
- Single Yellow
- Single Yellow + JI

Now, the only signal before the signal with JIs at the points is the starter off International. As the point speed at Domestic is 50km/h, while the straight before it is 100km/h, if the 60km/h board wasn't there, the best we would get in the starter at International is a single yellow (if going through the points, which most trains do). So the 60km/h board is there to allow a full green to be displayed at International so trains can go up to 100km/h (if they reach it) along the straight.

Then there is the 50 after the points (basically just means same speed for both roads).

The 40 with the signal: Apparently, when they were building the line, AirTrain (or whatever the company name is/was) was looking through the signalling standards and saw that a flashing yellow has a max speed of 40km/h. So, as the best this signal will show is a flashing yellow, they decided to put the 40km/h board in as a backup, or some such thing. The only problem is, on restricted signals, we are only allowed to travel at a max of 75% road speed, so passing this signal means now we can only go 30km/h because of the 40 board.

The 25 is essentially pointless, as it almost lines up to the magnet and we can only travel at 20km/h max over the magnet anyway. So, in theory, the speeds are:
100
60
50
40
25
20.

In reality, the speeds are:
100 (if you can reach it in the unit you're in)
60
45
35
30
25
20.

Inbound, there is a 70 board at the end of Domestic platform, increasing to 100 after the points. 80 at the end of the straight to International, 40 before the platform (why, I do not know. They could have put the 40 on the City side of the platform, but hey..)

Outbound heading towards the International from EJ, it goes from 100 to 80, down to 70 (about 150m after the 80 board), down to 50 (about 250m after the 80 board), then 40 for the points (about another 150m or so after the 50). The points are actually designed for 50km/h, but for some reason they only wanted to put 40 on them.

So, after all that, IMO the approach to Cleveland is fine. All the drivers know the road, we know the speed comes back to 25 (well, 15 now...) and we know the rough braking marks to bring the speed down to that level. Maybe a "Warning - 15 Ahead" board at the end of the 80 straight if they wanted to do something, but even then, there isn't a whole lot of point to it. If it was out in the middle of a section, maybe (example being Keperra to Grovely, 70 [used to be 80] down to 40 before the roadway - there is a "Warning 40 ahead" board at the start of the curve as a reminder for drivers), but being the end of the line, I don't think it's really needed, as like I say, we all know the station is coming up (it's an easy section from Ormiston as well, 70k curve, 80k straight, 70k curve, Cleveland.), so not really needed.

[ozbob]

I noted your comments re poor adhesion on acceleration too Petey, clearly there is an issue with them.  It seems for the scan of the web I did that it is a relatively common issue with the more modern emus with the disc brakes and WSP.   I don't think QR need to run RHTTs everywhere, but need to perhaps  paint Sandite on known trouble spots until they can fix the units themselves.  I would not be surprised to see auto-sanders added to them. 

Someone told me that slippage issues with the units is not a problem in the same way as say the Cleveland line, because of the heavy coal tonnage on the Ippy.  Do you think there is any basis to that?

[BrizCommuter]

Cue Brizcommuter talking about leaf delays on the London Underground. 

On cue...
http://brizcommuter.blogspot.com.au/2013/03/slipnslide-on-cleveland-line.html

[ozbob]

Cue Brizcommuter talking about leaf delays on the London Underground. 

On cue...
http://brizcommuter.blogspot.com.au/2013/03/slipnslide-on-cleveland-line.html

[ozbob]

I noted your comments re poor adhesion on acceleration too Petey, clearly there is an issue with them.  It seems for the scan of the web I did that it is a relatively common issue with the more modern emus with the disc brakes and WSP.   I don't think QR need to run RHTTs everywhere, but need to perhaps  paint Sandite on known trouble spots until they can fix the units themselves.  I would not be surprised to see auto-sanders added to them. 

Someone told me that slippage issues with the units is not a problem in the same way as say the Cleveland line, because of the heavy coal tonnage on the Ippy.  Do you think there is any basis to that?

so is that the main issue here, that on the 160/260 series as the brakes don't contact the wheels directly they cannot clean the rubbish off them?

According to the ATSB prelim report the coefficient of friction is lessened under some environmental conditions with such systems compared to brake systems that have brake blocks on the wheel treads.  And that is generally known.  The Siemens trains in Melbourne were good skaters too before they were fitted with auto sanders.  At one point the Seimens trains had all sorts of speed restrictions which really caused a lot of problems with timetables.  It would appear that the present crop of 160/260s have a similar issue, although some suggest there may be more too it, perhaps a problem with how the WSP operates ...

As the ATSB reckons the systems themselves are OK, then you are left with an inherent flaw with the design, that can under some environmental conditions fail.

I think of it as when I was kid on the bicycles.  I had a PMG bike which I used to use for work, delivering telegrams.  It was a solid red bike with a hub brake.  You know the type you press back on the pedal.  It always worked, wet or dry and it was mainly wet in Melbourne. Some times you skidded on the road and tramtracks but that happens.  My other bicycle,  I had chain gears, so no hub brake and the brakes that had blocks on the rims of the wheel.  They worked fine in the dry, but wet they would not grip very well. You had to start braking really early to dry the rims sort of with prolonged application and then they would grip.  I think this is sort of what drivers are faced with at the moment.  The trains brake fine normally, but every now and then, when conditions are right, off they go skating ...

[petey3801]

So what we are saying is that a train coming into Cleveland, slows to 70 and then at some point starts the speed reduction which if wet maybe eariler such that he's at 15 prior to the station. If he finds the rails are slippery and not slowing as fast as he likes he goes full brake. If this doesn't work, he has a "toilet brake" and there is not a damn thing that can be done about it AWS or not?

That's pretty much sums it up nicely.

[SurfRail]

A case of the "wrong kind" of gum leaves?

[petey3801]

Was thinking a bit more last night about the speeds, essentially there already is an advance speed board in the Cleveland home signal, which will only show as good as a single yellow, which means a max of 50km/h (75% road speed).

[ozbob]

Report  ABC News QR have agreed to do something re the brakes 160/260s ...

Sent from my GT-I9300 using Tapatalk 2

[ozbob]

From the ABC News click here!

Qld Rail agrees to review train brakes: union

Qld Rail agrees to review train brakes: union
By Jason Rawlins

The Rail, Tram and Bus Union (RTBU) says Queensland Rail has agreed to improve 'wheel adhesion' on the type of commuter train involved in an accident on Brisbane's bayside.

A report released earlier this month found "wheel slide" was the likely cause of an accident that saw a train plough into Cleveland Station in January.

RTBU spokesman Owen Doogan says Queensland Rail (QR) has belatedly agreed to fit a braking solution to the type of train involved in the incident.

"We've been quite stunned by QR management," he said.

"The working group that was put together took the rogue trains off and then were [over-ridden] by higher management.

"Fortunately we were able to get that sorted out so nothing negative occurred."

Mr Doogan says QR has now vowed to spend millions to address the problems.

"We are hopeful that this will be the long-term fix," he said.

"At least now QR is spending the money to improve the breaking capacity of the 160 and 260 trains - that is certainly a positive step forward."

[Derwan]

http://www.facebook.com/QueenslandRail/posts/579247988760232

A message from Queensland Rail Acting CEO Jim Benstead
Interim Report of Wheel/Rail Interface Working Group

On 20 February this year, I formed a joint working group to look at potential wheel/rail interface issues - particularly with the 160 and 260 Class rollingstock – in certain conditions.

I asked for this work to be done on the back of testing that we conducted after the incident at Cleveland in which a 160 Class train went through the stop block and into a station building.

We implemented a range of measures soon after the incident to reduce the risk of slide in conditions such as those on the section of track near Cleveland Station.

These measures included:
· new train handling procedures for drivers, and reduced speed approaching yellow signals and stopping points;
· new procedures for train controllers when reports were received of slide, as well as new track inspection requirements. Our attention is focussed particularly on specific locations where we have found an increased risk of rail head contamination; and
· a requirement for confirmation of any driver report of excessive slide (six cars pass the platform or 200m past an expected stopping point), and removal of the rollingstock involved from service for downloading and analysis of the black box data. Units to be returned to service ONLY if the cause of the slide was not related to the vehicle. Rollingstock was not to be removed from service where the track condition was identified as the primary cause of slide.

An independent expert risk assessment deemed that the interim measures we took rendered the residual risk tolerable in the short term.

However, I wanted to explore all options for a more sustainable, long term solution that would further reduce the risk.

I invited the AFULE and the RTBU to join a Queensland Rail working group which had access to the manufacturers of the trains, independent engineering experts, and the manufacturers of the trains' brakes. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau, which was investigating the Cleveland incident, and the Rail Safety Regulator were also invited to observe.

The Wheel/Rail Interface Working Group commissioned independent analysis of available data on safety occurrences for all suburban rollingstock between May 2007 (when 160/260 trains entered service) and January 2013 to determine if the 160/260 fleet performed differently from other fleets

The analysis found no significant or meaningful difference in the data:
· Overruns and slide occurrence appeared random across all fleet types
· For all slide related occurrences, the 160/260 fleet performed better than other fleets
· The 160/260s also performed better in relation to Signals Passed at Danger (SPADS)
· While the 160/260 fleet performed worse on station overruns, this was more pronounced in wet and very wet conditions.

A review of data recorders on trains involved in excessive slide occurrences showed that in all instances, the train braking systems appeared to perform as they were designed to perform.

The interim ATSB report into the Cleveland incident arrived at a similar conclusion and found that contamination of the rail head (surface) most likely contributed to slide in that incident.

I have now received the interim appraisal report of the Working Group, including recommendations for action to further reduce the hazards created by contamination of the rail surface, including some engineering solutions.

The Working Group has recommended a holistic approach to both removing contaminant and increasing adhesion at the wheel/rail interface.

It recommends a range of measures including retrofitting the 160/260 Class fleet with a sanding system similar to one used on Bombardier trains operating in Victoria. This system applies sand to the wheels of the train when slip is detected by the brake control unit.

The sanding systems will be incorporated into the design specifications for new trains planned for Queensland Rail.

Other recommendations of the Working Group include:
· An assessment of current Vegetation Control processes and whether they have potential to cause contamination of the rail;
· The need for a long-term plan from Network to address all aspects of contaminant prevention;
· Continue a program of testing to establish train braking performance at low adhesion conditions and evaluation of solutions to reduce the hazard;
· Engagement of Monash and CQU universities to establish scope and possibilities for involvement in localised Wheel/Rail Interface research;
· Engagement of independent rollingstock expert to conduct an independent peer review of rollingstock group actions and processes;
· Research wheel cleansing modification opportunities; and.
· Continue ongoing WSP research with manufacturers.

I have asked for a business case to be prepared as soon as possible for the retrofitting of the sanding system, and I have directed that the other recommendations of the Working Group be implemented as quickly as possible.

We will continue always to act with safety as our priority. You can be assured that we will not operate trains or a network that is unsafe.

Jim Benstead

[ozbob]

... It recommends a range of measures including retrofitting the 160/260 Class fleet with a sanding system similar to one used on Bombardier trains operating in Victoria. This system applies sand to the wheels of the train when slip is detected by the brake control unit ...

Well there you go ...

[ozbob]

From the Couriermail click here!

Millions of dollars will be needed to fit new trains with devices for better braking after the Cleveland crash

Millions of dollars will be needed to fit new trains with devices for better braking after the Cleveland crash

    by: Robyn Ironside
    From: The Courier-Mail
    March 28, 2013 12:00AM

QUEENSLAND Rail is facing a bill of millions of dollars to fit 64 of its newest trains with sanding devices to ensure there is no repeat of the Cleveland train crash.

The devices apply sand to the wheels of a train when the brake control unit detects the wheel is slipping.

That increases friction and allows better brake operation.

The sanders cost an average of $171,000 each when they were installed on trains in Victoria almost two years ago.

Queensland Rail acting CEO Jim Benstead said he had asked for an urgent business case to be prepared for the retrofitting of the sanding system to the 160/260 class trains.

A working group set up in the wake of the January 31 crash analysed more than four years of safety occurrences and found the newer trains were more likely than older models to overrun stations - a problem made worse in wet weather.

The occurrences had been recorded by Queensland Rail since the 160/260 class trains began service in May 2007 but had never been closely examined.

Rail Tram and Bus Union secretary Owen Doogan expressed concerns that it took an incident like the Cleveland crash for the data to be reviewed.

"If the technology was there to monitor trains performing less safely than others, why was the data not sought until after an accident occurred?" he said.

The State Government is seeking more than $10 million in savings from Queensland Rail this year as part of its "efficiencies program" and was not in a position yesterday to say how it would afford the sanders.

The Courier-Mail understands Transport Minister Scott Emerson is still waiting to receive the business case from Queensland Rail.

Mr Doogan said the safety of commuters was more important than the cost of the devices.

Mr Benstead said Queensland Rail would also adopt other recommendations of the working group, including a vegetation audit around train lines, to reduce the risk of track contamination.