Redcliffe Peninsula Line [was MBRL (Petrie to Kippa Ring)]

[#Metro]

Happens all the time, that in itself isn't dumb.   Leaving QR out when they have a good track record is.
Ignoring the rail operators concerns about a critical safety component is criminal and should be investigated.

Of course it is dumb. The people who have the most information are the people at the coal face, not the people in the upper management or in a separate department.

It is like buying a gift for someone versus you going out and buying what you want for yourself. The incentives and information is aligned more closely in the second scenario than the first.

[Stillwater]

Can we be sure that the MBRL problems don't start and finish with the signalling?  Are there other components that could have been sourced from Dodgy Brothers Pty Ltd?

[#Metro]

The signalling is made by the same company as that is on the rest of the QR Network.

It is cheaper, but I wonder if that is simply coincidental. I think the problem is coming more from the fact that they are two different systems and do not talk to each other properly.

A bit like how some newer Microsoft Windows Programs can't be run on old Microsoft PCs...

The more I think about it, the more eerily similar this looks like to QLD Health Payroll. They chose a cheap system, it didn't work, push out the project, still didn't work.

It looks like nothing has been learned from previous stuff ups?

[red dragin]

A thought.

You would hope that the junction could be switched over to the existing QR signalling equipment setup, and have from the Kallangur Station side of the crossovers, to Kippa Ring running the already in place signalling.

It appears the issue is processing load, that could possibly bring it down below the "system crash number".

[colinw]

The signalling is made by the same company as that is on the rest of the QR Network.

That is not quite correct.

QR system is a mix of technologies including:

- older relay based interlocking (Westinghouse  and Union Switch & Signal).  Westinghouse is now Siemens.  US&S is Ansaldo.
- WESTRACE interlocking, now from Siemens. Was WESTRACE Mk2, newer installs with be Mk2.
- WESTLOCK interlocking, newer generation, e.g. at Indooroopilly and Darra.
- Ansaldo Microlok.

The new Ansaldo MAcroLok is not yet type approved in QLD, and would appear to be having some teething and/or integration issues.  Similar things happened (with less media B******t) with earlier generations, thankfully resolved.

Enough.  Zip it people.  Now. Please.

[ozbob]

Thanks.  As I indicated above, the problem is the interlocking integration.  It will hopefully be resolved.

[colinw]

It'll get there, always does ... in the end.  Ansaldo are a professional outfit with good market share and many successful installations on metros, commuter lines, mainline and high speed.  Their stuff works, and works well - all over the world and in many places on the QR system.  As does the equivalent gear from my own employer, which has likewise had commissioning difficulties like this and gotten through in the end.

The politics and media stuff is not helpful.

[#Metro]

The new Ansaldo MAcroLok is not yet type approved in QLD, and would appear to be having some teething and/or integration issues.  Similar things happened (with less media B******t) with earlier generations, thankfully resolved.

What does "type approved" mean?

[ozbob]

Colin may wish to comment, but as I understand it ' meets a minimum set of regulatory, technical and safety requirements '

Being a first in this state for this implementation it will need to demonstrate that the system meets the requirements.

[colinw]

^^^ what Bob says.  Here's the NSW process, QLD is not significantly different (but can't find it online where I can point to):

http://www.asa.transport.nsw.gov.au/sites/default/files/asa/railcorp-legacy/disciplines/signals/spg-0710.pdf

UK and European processes are similar.  QLD is very much on industry standard practice in this area, no Queenslander! factor to be found within QR there.

http://www.networkrail.co.uk/aspx/3262.aspx

This kind of integration issue is far more common than you would think, and by no means indicative of any kind of failure in tendering or development process.  Been in this space myself on a job in another industry ... ended up cutting urgent code fixes sitting in a hotel room in Hamilton, NZ, for another go the next day.  Problem wasn't our product, or their product - rather it was an interface specification that was a bit sloppy and open to interpretation.  Got it right after a couple of goes, then we reviewed and formalised and got acceptance some months later.  Thing is probably still out there doing its job 20 years later ...

[#Metro]

Thanks Colin, always helpful to have your specialist advice.

I read the Network Rail page you linked to, and it says:

Only accepted products - except those allowed by NR/L2/RSE/100/05 - shall be used on the rail infrastructure.

Am I correct in saying that what seems to have occurred here is that QR said that the signalling system was not type approved - but TMR/someone else went ahead and installed it anyway?

So, unapproved equipment was added to the QR network?

Isn't the purpose of type approval to prevent situations exactly like this?

There is the question though of how one would go about type approving something like a signalling system before actually installing and testing it somewhere.

I also looked at the RailCorp documents you linked.

2.3 Evaluation
If the submission is accepted, RailCorp or the RailCorp Representative will arrange for
the evaluation of the material provided, and for any tests necessary to measure the
quality and performance of the item.

The evaluation may range in scope from a simple analysis of design and performance
data, to the detailed technical and safety evaluation required for a computer-based
interlocking system, and to trial installations.

The evaluation should establish compliance and acceptable performance in relation to:
a) Established standards and or contract specifications
b) Performance history
c) Form and Fit
d) Functionality
e) Safety
f) Reliability, Availability, Maintainability
g) Supportability
h) Life cycle costs and benefits
i) Quality
j) Risks
k) Documentation
l) Configuration Management
m) Interface Risks

Typical analysis processes are shown in Appendix A .

I note 'lifecycle' costs because there was an upfront 'saving' of 7 million, but obviously that assumes that everything works - which it doesn't.

2.4 Trial Installation

A trial installation is generally required, to evaluate the installation, operation,
compatibility and reliability of the item in the RailCorp's infrastructure. The trial site will be
chosen to meet RailCorp's requirements.

Depending on the nature of the item, the trial installation may be subjected to periods of
'normal' operation, with continuous monitoring and logging where considered appropriate,
RailCorp Engineering Specification — Signals — Construction Specification
Type Approval Requirements for Signalling Systems and Equipment SPG 0710
and to intermittent periods of planned testing of system performance under abnormal or
failure conditions.

The trial installation requirement may be waived if there is an operational installation in
Australia that is similar to the RailCorp proposed application, available to be inspected by
the Railcorp Representative, and for which relevant data on operational history are
available.

So what testing was done / trials were done with the system given that QR was not a party to the project?

[SurfRail]

It's a project management issue really.  I have no doubt at all that there is no inherent problem in the product involved.

I think legitimate questions can be asked about the extent to which expert advice was overridden, given what happened with Caltabiano and the government at the time.

[#Metro]

It's a project management issue really. 

It sounds rather straightforward.

1. Rail project did not include rail operator to a large extent
2. Rail operator raises red flag
3. Cost override made by project controller (TMR?) taking red flag down
4. Type approval trials / testing possibly not done / omitted thereby violating the rule that says you don't add unapproved stuff to the network
5. QR runs tests by running trains on the line and then detects problem.

The Railcorp document mentions trial installations and testing evaluations. I expect QR would have something similar. Were these done before the signalling system was installed for the whole line?

In some ways this is similar to the Queensland Health payroll thing. Mater was approached by IBM and apparently Mater apparently asked for a model to be constructed and do a demo on (proof of concept/validation). Apparently after this Mater said no. Apparently this was not the case with Queensland Health.

[colinw]

Unapproved equipment cannot and will not be added to QR or any other network, so what has happened here is.

1. Project goes to tender of signalling/interlocking.
2. Vendor is chosen, including a type not yet approved. (Nothing unusual about that - new types of equipment being selected and undergoing approval process is a routine thing. My current project includes type approval and commissioning of equipment not previously used on the railway we're working for).
3. Design & installation proceeds, along with type approval documentation and reviews, etc.  Not sure where those approvals are at, but rest assured the line cannot open without them done.
4. Integration testing ahead of Petrie Jct commissioning appears to have found an issue, at which point a typically brain-dead political and media circus ensues (but note the highly professional response of minister Hinchliffe - it is what is expected, and I would expect the same from the LNP if in power).

We're now at the point where there's a storm in a teacup occupying everyone's attention, with outrageous claims and counter claims, and whining about the line not being open for "months".

Meanwhile a bunch of very stressed engineers somewhere are burning the midnight oil trying to figure out what's broke and how to fix it.

1. Best case - somebody spots something simple (but not obvious), it gets fixed, tested, approved, and the problem goes away.
2. Most likely - drags on for a few weeks, gets sorted, line opens, and we all start frothing about the first steam train to Redcliffe.
3. Worst case - liquidated damages claims, legal action, and a crash priority "rip it out and stick something else in" project.

1 and 3 are your outliers on the bell curve.  2 is what I more or less expect to happen.

I am aware of ONE project, in London, where a complete Interlocking install went seriously awry and was replaced without ever working. That was a legacy interoperability issue.

I think the real issue here is probably one of project management and schedule. As such, it would be typical of projects that find themselves stressed, as leaving yourself insufficient budget and time to mitigate all risks is a worldwide phenomenon.

[#Metro]

So basically you are saying that you install and pay for the whole thing before testing it/type approving it?

Why not trial evaluation? Are there other operators in Australia using MakroLok?

[BrizCommuter]

Enough.  Zip it people.  Now. Please.

There are thousands of commuters still without a train line that should have opened months ago. Thousands more still awaiting faster timetables. Why should we zip it?

[ozbob]

Colin was referring to misinformed sledges ...

The issues of the delays in opening and impacts was not being referred to in that sense.  Obviously that is fair comment material.

Sunshine Coast and Caboollture lines are missing out as well as MBRL itself of course.  Staff have been employed on the basis of the line opening etc. 

[colinw]

Enough.  Zip it people.  Now. Please.

There are thousands of commuters still without a train line that should have opened months ago. Thousands more still awaiting faster timetables. Why should we zip it?

I was referring to inflammatory and potentially defamatory things being said that could reflect very poorly on this group and its reputation.

I have no qualms about applying it to much of the hysterical nonsense I've seen posted (here and in other forums) about MBRL and other projects, very little of which bears any resemblance to reality within the industry.

Bob has done a wonderful job raising the issues and getting a foot in the door with media and pollies.  I'd hate to see that undone by immoderate or untruthful accusations in the forum.  This is all publicly visible, and it affects the group's credibility.

[colinw]

So basically you are saying that you install and pay for the whole thing before testing it/type approving it?

Why not trial evaluation? Are there other operators in Australia using MakroLok?

No what I am saying it is being procured and type approved using exactly the same processes that are standard across rail projects world wide.  To do differently would truly be the "Queenslander" thing people are so fond of saying around here ...

The way we do this here in Queensland is not significantly different to on projects I've been involved with in NZ, or the UK, or Malaysia, or anywhere else.

Sadly, these kind of ****ups do happen from time to time ... the hard bit is (apparently) learning from them, because the same stupid darn things seem to happen worldwide - and it nearly always comes down to unfortunate interactions of project management and politics.  Politicans and railways - never a good mix

[#Metro]

No what I am saying it is being procured and type approved using exactly the same processes that are standard across rail projects world wide.  To do differently would truly be the "Queenslander" thing people are so fond of saying around here ...

This is what I don't understand.

Caution should be proportionate to both cost and scale.

What I am hearing is that someone builds, installs and pays for a not-yet-approved system, turns it on and then sees what happens.

To me, that sounds like a huge and costly experiment, especially if it has not been used before in QLD. It explains why QR was uneasy about doing that.

If you compare this to say, medicines, a company would have to prove that it was safe before it was sold to the public. They would do small scale trials etc. The same with cars - you have a test track and crash dummies.

Is is possible to do small scale controlled evaluation before buying and installing the signaling on the wider network?

---

Defamation Act 2005
Act No. 55 of 2005
https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/legisltn/acts/2005/05ac055.pdf

31 Defences of honest opinion

(1) It is a defence to the publication of defamatory matter if the
defendant proves that—

(a) the matter was an expression of opinion of the defendant
rather than a statement of fact; and

(b) the opinion related to a matter of public interest; and
(c) the opinion is based on proper material.

IMHO MBRL is a matter of public interest.
It is also the subject of investigation and mentioned in Parliament, there are other provisions that deal with that.

[tazzer9]

Everyone on the north side of brisbane should be getting angry from this.
Its also the bus improvements, the improved caboolture and subshine coast line timetables, the possible improvements for ipswich and springfield customers, The slightly better service south of northgate.   

[Derwan]

Bottom line: QR advised against the signalling system but it was installed anyway.

This is a statement of fact.  People will use it to fling mud at whoever they think is responsible for making that decision.  Whether that is justified is up to interpretation.

Fingers crossed it gets fixed soon.

[verbatim9]

Being the same company supplying the Macro and the rest of the network being Micro surely they can provide an interface for free? Allowing for multiple requests?

[Stillwater]

The motivation and impetus, and the imperative, is that the problem be fixed.  It will be.  The issue is the lessons learned, and they are likely to be around project management and clear lines of responsibility.

This is not a safety issue because no-one has been hurt or placed in danger.  It could be argued that the system worked, because the quality assurance phase picked up this problem.  How do we avoid it happening again is where the community will be seeking clear direction from the government and the Minister.

[STB]

Everyone on the north side of brisbane should be getting angry from this.
Its also the bus improvements, the improved caboolture and subshine coast line timetables, the possible improvements for ipswich and springfield customers, The slightly better service south of northgate.

Probably better not to be angry about this, but to be looking at what went wrong exactly and be constructive in working out how to make sure this doesn't happen again or reduce the chances of it happening again.  Simply getting angry won't really achieve anything other than venting emotionally which doesn't change the situation.

I'm quite confident it'll be fixed and the line will be well used over time.

[ozbob]

Media statement
Minister for Transport and the Commonwealth Games
The Honourable Stirling Hinchliffe

Rail expert appointed to audit Moreton Bay Rail Link Project

One of Australia's leading rail signalling experts has been appointed to lead the independent investigation into the Moreton Bay Rail Link (MBRL) Project.

Minister for Transport Stirling Hinchliffe announced Mr Rob Smith, currently contracted to the $20 billion Sydney Metro Northwest Project, would audit the procurement and governance of the signalling system for MBRL.

"Mr Smith is eminently qualified to examine the MBRL project and has more than 20 years of experience in design and project management for rail systems," Mr Hinchliffe said.

"Mr Smith specialises in delivering rail signalling systems and his extensive knowledge will be extremely beneficial to the audit and ensure we can get to the bottom of why the signalling system currently installed does not meet the operational and safety standards found across South East Queensland's rail network."

Mr Hinchliffe announced the independent audit on Monday, 30 May after receiving advice from Queensland Rail about outstanding issues with the signalling system for the rail infrastructure project.

"The audit will investigate the governance and contractual processes for the signalling system and its performance and integration during design and construction," he said.

"Ultimately this audit will determine how the signalling system was selected and why the project cannot be delivered within the expected timeframe.

"This review will run separately to the work being undertaken by Queensland Rail into the requirements of the signalling system in order for Moreton Bay Rail Link to open."

The Department of Transport and Main Roads, Queensland Rail and other parties will provide relevant documents as requested for the audit.

The independent audit will be complete, with final reports handed to the Minister for Transport by the end of July.

Mr Smith will lead a team of rail experts to prepare the audit.

Please note:             The Terms of Reference for the independent audit and details of Mr Smith's professional experience are outlined below.


Professional experience –

Rob Smith

Rail Systems Manager, Transport for New South Wales (TfNSW)

Mr Smith is a senior rail systems manager, with more than 20 years' experience in the design and project management of rail systems. He is currently Chair of the Sydney Metro/Sydney Trains Integration Configuration Change Board which is the authority within TfNSW for the Northwest Rail Link Project and Sydney Trains to assess safety and risk acceptance when it effects the existing Sydney Trains operational railway. He has a record of providing advice to state and international governments' on rail projects, including reviews for the Victorian Government on large-scale projects including high capacity signalling (CBTC), Melbourne Metro, Data Train Radio, and also the PPP submission for the Gold Coast Rapid Transit. Mr Smith is also a member of the Victorian Department of Transport's Independent Expert Panel.



The full scope of the review will consider:

Governance and Contractual processes for MBRL, including:

    Any signalling system related issues, risks and/or opportunities arising from the decision in 2012 to bring the project under the auspices of the Department of Transport and Main Roads (TMR);
    A review of the signalling system elements of the tendering and contract process;
    Whether the role assigned to Queensland Rail through contractual and/or governance documents and processes provided for appropriate involvement of the rail operator in the assurance processes relating to signalling; and
    Contract milestone payments relating to signalling, and gainshare payments, and the grounds upon which any payments have been made.

Performance and integration of signalling systems during design and construction, including:

    The nature of assurance activities by the project team, Queensland Rail, or other parties to monitor, test, and review signalling systems and signalling system interface/integration;
    The nature of interface/integration issues experienced between multiple signalling systems on the one network; and
    The adequacy of assurance activities, and lessons for future rail contract selection and oversight;
    The processes by which concerns raised by Queensland Rail or other parties regarding the signalling systems or signalling system integration were managed; and
    The assurance program being implemented by Queensland Rail in order to have the project commissioned.

[ozbob]

Brisbanetimes --> Signals expert to probe Queensland's Moreton Bay Rail Link

[Stillwater]

An unfortunate twist to this story:

http://www.adelaidenow.com.au/news/national/moreton-bay-rail-link-santo-santoro-lobbied-on-behalf-of-signalling-company/news-story/8b5427a7e3ba89c51bc96ed8c2c03f52

[ozbob]

Couriermail --> Moreton Bay Rail Link: Santo Santoro lobbied on behalf of signalling company

FORMER Liberal heavyweight Santo Santoro's consultancy lobbied senior bureaucrats on behalf of the company whose signalling system was chosen for the indefinitely-delayed Moreton Bay Rail Link.

Queensland's lobbyist register reveals Ansaldo STS was a client of Santoro Consulting, of which former Liberal MP and senator Santo Santoro is a director.

The register shows Santoro Consulting helped Ansaldo STS secure two high-level meetings with government in 2013, in the months before the contracts for the rail ­project were awarded.

The first meeting was held with Transport and Main Roads director-general Neil Scales on August 21, 2013.

The second meeting was held about two months later, on October 31, with Queensland Treasury and Trade officials including former assistant under treasurer, Transport and Main Roads Group, John O'Connell and Transport and Main Roads director Trevor Dann.

Right to Information documents also indicate a meeting was secured between former Queensland Rail CEO Glen Dawe and Ansaldo and Mr Santoro in September 2013.

Ansaldo STS's signalling system was eventually chosen for the rail project in June 2014, saving the project about $7 million.

Mr Santoro could not be reached for comment.

Transport Minister Stirling Hinchliffe last week announced the $1 billion rail link had been delayed after Queensland Rail raised safety concerns about the system.

The Courier-Mail revealed this week that while Ansaldo's other system had been used successfully on the rail network, Queensland Rail had ranked its MAcrolok system lower than other options for the rollout of the rail link.

An independent audit is now under way into the handling of the project, including the awarding of contracts.

Meanwhile QR is working to make the signalling system work. It is expected to report to Mr Hinchliffe next month.

"Queensland Rail is urgently working to resolve the signalling issues and will take the lead in finalising the commercial and technical arrangements required to get the signalling system up to standard, online and tested," a spokeswoman for QR said.

Mr Hinchliffe said signalling expert Rob Smith would lead the investigation.

"Mr Smith specialises in delivering rail signalling systems and his extensive knowledge will be extremely beneficial to the audit and ensure we can get to the bottom of why the signalling system currently installed does not meet the operational and safety standards found around southeast Queensland's rail network."

The link was the first rail project in recent history run by the department, not QR. Former transport minister Scott Emerson announced his department would take the lead in 2012.

The various construction alliances which Queensland Rail was a part, eg Caboolture to Beerburrum 2008, Corinda to Darra 2009, Darra to Richlands 2010, Richlands to Springfield 2011 all came in under deadlines and budgets with no issues cf. this to MBRL 

" The link was the first rail project in recent history run by the department, not QR. Former transport minister Scott Emerson announced his department would take the lead in 2012. "

There was no justification for removing Queensland Rail from the MBRL alliance, it was shitty polyticks and mates.



Also I think Minister Hinchliffe has been spot on in terms of the Government's response.

[#Metro]

I am factually accurate when I think of this as "LNP trail of disaster"

Because that's what it is.

First, they put Caltabiano, ex-Liberal State President, in as Director General.

Then they screwed up the fares with 9-then waste

Then they messed up the bus review

Then they presented BaT which had lower BCR and NPV than CRR1 it replaced (err, but it was 'cheap'!!). Every 2nd corner seemed like it was was cut - stations missing etc.

Then MBRL was messed up because QR was separated from the project that was being built for it (crazy - who leaves the customer out of their own project?)

Now we find out that a LNP linked firm run by ex LNP 'powerbrokers' lobbied for the non-type approved system.

LNP disaster - absolutely.

And after all of this, there is another round coming up with Quack Metro,
which has as much mathematical sense to it as 1 + 1 = 5.

[Stillwater]

It remains unclear whether Mr Rob Smith, whose investigation is getting to the bottom of the signalling issue from a technical perspective, is also going to look at the wider probity and project management issues.  Mr Hinchliffe needs to explain the position from here, in the light of these latest revelations.

It also is worrying that TMR is taking the leading role, with QR in a secondary role, on a review of the SCL duplication, it has been suggested in order to strip out $30 million in savings on a project that, ultimately, will cost billions of dollars to construct.  If reports on this site are accurate, this has already resulted in decisions being made that will lower operational and speed levels allowed on realigned dual tracks when the SCL duplication finally proceeds.

The decision to go with the particular signalling system on the MBRL was to save $7 million.  How much more than $7 million will it cost to fix the problem?

If the state government (this time under Labor and Mr Hinchliffe, not LNP) are overseeing a similar process of TMR undertaking project scaling back and axe blade cost-cutting on the SCL, given that the new track and alignment will be with us for decades and maybe a century to come, are we not about to repeat on the SCL the exact same circumstances as led to the problems now emerging on the MBRL?

[ozbob]

Brisbanetimes --> Santo Santoro linked to Moreton Bay Rail Link problems

[Stillwater]

Brisbane Times refers to QR as the 'rail provider'.  Is QR now just a 'service provider' to TMR, and is this a precursor to QR being corporatised, then eventually privatised'?

[ozbob]

Brisbane Times refers to QR as the 'rail provider'.  Is QR now just a 'service provider' to TMR, and is this a precursor to QR being corporatised, then eventually privatised'?

I have no doubt that was what the LNP et al. were really up to but some things linger ..

TMR < 

[Derwan]

I am factually accurate when I think of this as "LNP trail of disaster"

*Sings*

They came in like a wreeeeecking ball!!!

[#Metro]

*Sings*

They came in like a wreeeeecking ball!!!

^^ That is a fantastic video - I find this and post it!
Must have one made up for the QLD version. Pink jumpsuits and all!

After 3 years, what did they achieve? They managed to pee just about everybody off!!

LNP Demolition Team

[ozbob]

From the Couriermail 11th June 2016 page 43

Train link stalled by wrong signals

[ozbob]

^

Now on line ..

==================

Couriermail --> Weak link stops commuters in tracks

[#Metro]

Peter Quick's pieces / contributions are truly a gift to read.

It is just unbelievable that after Queensland Health payroll and MBRL - both based on a breakdown of communications, there is going to be a push to have Quack Metro installed.

[ozbob]

The quack Metro is so flawed as proposed, that there is simply no way a competent State Government would allow it to proceed and wreck public transport in Brisbane & SEQ.  In fact the problems with MBRL, may well help to put the pie-in-the-sky quacker metro under very tight scrutiny - and it will fold or morph eventually into a real automatic metro with 6-8 car trains etc.  Much the same way as the ' Cleveland Solution - which featured light rail in the Brisbane River '  which soon disappeared down the river, and the much celebrated non-acronym BaT - which flew away into the night with the flying foxes!

Onwards!