Signal Passed At Danger - SPAD

[Stillwater]

While rules and regulations are important for an effective organisation, the situation at QR involves deep-rooted corporate culture.  A taskforce looking at SPAD incidents and causes is fine, but please go further and look to other issues  .... silo mentality, left-hand, right-hand thinking and planning, ..... appropriate allocation of resources around the organisation, skills sets .... and an absolute fixation on public image to the extent that the cracks are being papered over.  Just a quick glance at the RTI stuff that's coming out shows an organisation that feels it is under siege and will do anything -- including ignoring the warning signs -- to make itself look good externally, hiding things from the public and the politicians, while red flags are popping up all over the place.  It is an organisation confused by the relative responsibilities and relationships with TMR and TransLink. It appears to be an organisation that feels it can't control what's going on because of those relationships - and by political interference, it must be said.

Yet, this is not a failure of QR, it is a failure of Government. 

[ozbob]

While rules and regulations are important for an effective organisation, the situation at QR involves deep-rooted corporate culture.  A taskforce looking at SPAD incidents and causes is fine, but please go further and look to other issues  .... silo mentality, left-hand, right-hand thinking and planning, ..... appropriate allocation of resources around the organisation, skills sets .... and an absolute fixation on public image to the extent that the cracks are being papered over.  Just a quick glance at the RTI stuff that's coming out shows an organisation that feels it is under siege and will do anything -- including ignoring the warning signs -- to make itself look good externally, hiding things from the public and the politicians, while red flags are popping up all over the place.  It is an organisation confused by the relative responsibilities and relationships with TMR and TransLink. It appears to be an organisation that feels it can't control what's going on because of those relationships - and by political interference, it must be said.

Yet, this is not a failure of QR, it is a failure of Government.

I think that is an astute and accurate analysis Mr Stillwater.

Carrying on as they have will not really sort the long standing issues with QR, TransLink and DTMR. 
We all know what needs to occur, but they still bumble on to an ever worsening situation.

[PoliticalFootball]

Interesting articles from CM.

Suggests two things:

- Also suggests that guards can decrease the safety of rail operations through distraction. This is evidence against the idea that guards always enhance safety and thus a transition to DOO would reduce safety.

Another observation is that the SPADS metric is too simplistic. It treats a 1m signal violation the same as a 95m violation. Clearly, the risk of a crash increases as the distance travelled past the danger signal increases also.

Guards only decrease safety if they are not performing their role correctly ie  being in the active cab while in motion.

Agree on your other point though. A 1m SPAD does not carry the same weight as a 100m SPAD. Some signals are far more dangerous than others as well so they shouldn't be treated the same.

[red dragin]

SPAD measurement is more complex than just the distance. A red protecting a 2km long block on dual track single direction signalling is a lot lower risk than a red protecting a diamond crossing in the CBD.

Agree with the suggestion, but am suggesting it's more complex than just a distance measure

[ozbob]

https://twitter.com/Robert_Dow/status/1016178539769442304

[Stillwater]

I am sick of this data manipulation.  CEO says there has been a 5 per cent reduction in SPADS ... from when to when?  over what timeframe?  Was it on Fridays?  or during a period of sh%t timetables?  Just give us the honest truth please, no embellishment, no sniping about how better this performance is than when the last lot were in government.  Stop the games, please.  Above all, be honest to yourselves.

[ozbob]

https://www.onrsr.com.au/safety-improvement/signals-passed-at-danger

Signals passed at danger

A signal passed at danger (SPAD) is an occurrence where a train passes a signal displaying a stop indication without the authority to do so.

Only a small percentage of SPADs result in a serious accident but they provide warnings about failures or deficiencies in safety risk controls, including those associated with human factors.

It is important to reduce SPADs because then the chance of a serious accident is much less.  QR is running at very high historical SPAD rates.  Not publishing the performance metric for SPAD is really telling.  The other metrics are being kept back to give cover.

Many ex QR types have been warning that the risk of a serious accident is increasing and almost inevitable based on their observations.  These are warnings I take note of. 

So I will keep pushing hard for proper transparency.
There is not much else we can do..

Internalising the SPAD issue is not helpful to anyone in the end.

[#Metro]

Hey Stillwater, it's like the global warming graph where people pick a section that appears to show a plateau or even a local decrease, and then argue that its not real.

Data hold back appears to be yet another manifestation of the Ministerial intervention pathway. The sooner competitive contracting comes in, along with a fines and penalties regime, the better!

[ozbob]

Sent to all outlets:

11th July 2018

Data !! Re: An open letter to the Chair Queensland Rail Board

Morning!

Well what do you know?  The Queensland Rail performance metrics have been updated till April 2018.  We would very much like to see May and June too please.  Nevertheless, thank you for at least finally publishing some of the missing data.

As we suspected, and why we have been driving hard for transparency the SPAD rate remains very high.



https://www.queenslandrail.com.au/aboutus/ourperformance/safety-and-security

For those not necessarily aware of what a SPAD is:

https://www.onrsr.com.au/safety-improvement/signals-passed-at-danger

A signal passed at danger (SPAD) is an occurrence where a train passes a signal displaying a stop indication without the authority to do so.

Only a small percentage of SPADs result in a serious accident but they provide warnings about failures or deficiencies in safety risk controls, including those associated with human factors.

It is important to reduce SPADs because then the chance of a serious accident is much less.  QR is running at very high historical SPAD rates.  Not publishing the performance metric for SPAD has been very telling in our view.  The other metrics were being kept back to give cover in our opinion.

Many ex QR types have been warning that the risk of a serious accident is increasing and almost inevitable based on their observations.  These are warnings I take note of.

So we will keep pushing hard for proper transparency. There is not much else we can do when we have such blunt intransigence and incompetence in the transport portfolio and transport agencies.

Internalising the SPAD issue is not helpful to anyone in the end. Covering up data and being tardy with its publication is not helpful to rail recovery is it?  It is simply not being transparent.

Please publish the QR performance data for May and June ASAP.

Thank you.

Best wishes,
Robert

Robert Dow
Administration
admin@backontrack.org
RAIL Back On Track https://backontrack.org

[ Attached:  https://railbotforum.org/mbs/index.php?topic=12649.msg211028#msg211028 ]

[ozbob]

https://twitter.com/Robert_Dow/status/1016716545731452928

https://twitter.com/Robert_Dow/status/1016718201353146369

https://twitter.com/Robert_Dow/status/1016718774085357570

[ozbob]

The question now of course is what are the SPAD rates for May and June?

Steady, rising or falling?

[JustSomeTrainGuy]

My theory; the data was released purely to shut us up. If it hadn't been released, the RTI would've been made requesting May and June also. I can almost guarantee that they're trying to hide May and June specifically because the rate is increasing at an alarming pace. Until the remainder is released, I have no reason to believe otherwise.

[ozbob]

Give them one week from today.  No publication for May and June by Queensland Rail, or other media outlet in goes a RTI.

I think the ' open letter ' to the Chair of the QR Board helped focus a few minds. 

The Government is very poor in terms of transparency.  They are allowed to be by an ineffective opposition. 
We are in fact doing what the opposition should be about.   

[ozbob]

https://twitter.com/Robert_Dow/status/1017147708971220992

[ozbob]

https://twitter.com/7NewsBrisbane/status/1016963253203660800

[HappyTrainGuy]

- Also suggests that guards can decrease the safety of rail operations through distraction. This is evidence against the idea that guards always enhance safety and thus a transition to DOO would reduce safety.

Its only evidence when you don't obey safeworking procedures and then if you can make it fit your crime. For instance at the banyo level crossing incident the guard on the SMU at the station didn't know a truck was blocking the crossing. The driver of the SMU at the station did and didn't radio control. Half a minute later he watched as the EMU plowed into it and its 20t transformer at 35kph before having debris and the truck trailer hit his train.

Many of the spads involved drivers not following these same procedures or overrunning by a few meters. The one at Bowen Hills in August last year was attributed to the driver missing the safeworking procedure for a start on yellow - because the driver had a flash back to someone jumping infront of him when he saw someone acting up on the edge of the platform he never put it in neutral and brake controller to full service (had he have done this by habit the driver would have looked at the signal). Guard gave him the right of way after his checks and he snapped back into routine and took off. There were track workers in the area with speed restrictions (30kph? I think so its not like he had the train up to full line speed) in place so he made sure that he had alerted them to the trains presence. When he looked up the signal was red and he exceeded it by a carriage length and not the over dramatic 60m the courier mail has mentioned (not to be confused with the SMU SPAD at the same signal at the start of January this year).

The two normanby spads was a blatant ignoring of the safeworking procedure and Taringa was a guard going to work who knew the driver and got into the cab with him - not the actual guard onboard the train. Around the mid 2000's there were a number of spads on the Normanby section with guards present in or near the drivers cabs. They looked into it and found out that some crews were put into a false sense eg packing their stuff up, getting ready to end their shift, the train was no longer a passenger service and just general routine. Combine that with a guard distracting the driver with conversation and a spad was easy to take place. So they made it a safeworking rule as part of Zero Harm for guards not to be present around the drivers cab. There's also safeworking rules around who is permitted in the cabs. I recall one spad at Normanby which would have been around 2010 and the crew just got the book thrown at them.

SPAD measurement is more complex than just the distance. A red protecting a 2km long block on dual track single direction signalling is a lot lower risk than a red protecting a diamond crossing in the CBD.

Agree with the suggestion, but am suggesting it's more complex than just a distance measure

Most were simple overruns by a carriage or two. Some were due to outside factors such as the trackside system defaulting to red and the train approaching the signal has gone into emergency and registered as a spad. Only a handful were actually serious in nature. And I doubt Class B spads in yards were included in this I highly suspect that they have the data for the different types of spads. Just the public and media doesn't care for the detail simply because they would have no idea what it meant. The fact that the courier mail still says switches in articles means someone has no idea what they are writing about.

I am sick of this data manipulation.  CEO says there has been a 5 per cent reduction in SPADS ... from when to when?  over what timeframe?  Was it on Fridays?  or during a period of sh%t timetables?  Just give us the honest truth please, no embellishment, no sniping about how better this performance is than when the last lot were in government.  Stop the games, please.  Above all, be honest to yourselves.

QR saw a slight increase in the rate of SPADs on its network from July 2017 to January 2018, since the implementation of initiatives by the Taskforce from February 2018, there had been a stabilisation of this trend with the SPAD rate per million train kilometres decreasing by more than 5 per cent from January to May 2018 (from 2.53 to 2.40)

[PoliticalFootball]

- Also suggests that guards can decrease the safety of rail operations through distraction. This is evidence against the idea that guards always enhance safety and thus a transition to DOO would reduce safety.

Its only evidence when you don't obey safeworking procedures and then if you can make it fit your crime. For instance at the banyo level crossing incident the guard on the SMU at the station didn't know a truck was blocking the crossing. The driver of the SMU at the station did and didn't radio control. Half a minute later he watched as the EMU plowed into it and its 20t transformer at 35kph before having debris and the truck trailer hit his train.

Many of the spads involved drivers not following these same procedures or overrunning by a few meters. The one at Bowen Hills in August last year was attributed to the driver missing the safeworking procedure for a start on yellow - because the driver had a flash back to someone jumping infront of him when he saw someone acting up on the edge of the platform he never put it in neutral and brake controller to full service (had he have done this by habit the driver would have looked at the signal). Guard gave him the right of way after his checks and he snapped back into routine and took off. There were track workers in the area with speed restrictions (30kph? I think so its not like he had the train up to full line speed) in place so he made sure that he had alerted them to the trains presence. When he looked up the signal was red and he exceeded it by a carriage length and not the over dramatic 60m the courier mail has mentioned (not to be confused with the SMU SPAD at the same signal at the start of January this year).

The two normanby spads was a blatant ignoring of the safeworking procedure and Taringa was a guard going to work who knew the driver and got into the cab with him - not the actual guard onboard the train. Around the mid 2000's there were a number of spads on the Normanby section with guards present in or near the drivers cabs. They looked into it and found out that some crews were put into a false sense eg packing their stuff up, getting ready to end their shift, the train was no longer a passenger service and just general routine. Combine that with a guard distracting the driver with conversation and a spad was easy to take place. So they made it a safeworking rule as part of Zero Harm for guards not to be present around the drivers cab. There's also safeworking rules around who is permitted in the cabs. I recall one spad at Normanby which would have been around 2010 and the crew just got the book thrown at them.

SPAD measurement is more complex than just the distance. A red protecting a 2km long block on dual track single direction signalling is a lot lower risk than a red protecting a diamond crossing in the CBD.

Agree with the suggestion, but am suggesting it's more complex than just a distance measure

Most were simple overruns by a carriage or two. Some were due to outside factors such as the trackside system defaulting to red and the train approaching the signal has gone into emergency and registered as a spad. Only a handful were actually serious in nature. And I doubt Class B spads in yards were included in this I highly suspect that they have the data for the different types of spads. Just the public and media doesn't care for the detail simply because they would have no idea what it meant. The fact that the courier mail still says switches in articles means someone has no idea what they are writing about.

I am sick of this data manipulation.  CEO says there has been a 5 per cent reduction in SPADS ... from when to when?  over what timeframe?  Was it on Fridays?  or during a period of sh%t timetables?  Just give us the honest truth please, no embellishment, no sniping about how better this performance is than when the last lot were in government.  Stop the games, please.  Above all, be honest to yourselves.

QR saw a slight increase in the rate of SPADs on its network from July 2017 to January 2018, since the implementation of initiatives by the Taskforce from February 2018, there had been a stabilisation of this trend with the SPAD rate per million train kilometres decreasing by more than 5 per cent from January to May 2018 (from 2.53 to 2.40)

You are definitely a traincrew member 

[techblitz]

^ I think its been pretty obvious since railfail onset that HTG is affiliated with QR....he has been the single biggest 'to QR`s defense' poster on the forum..
Credit given...he has stuck around and watched the consistent flaming of his organisation by many and sundry here on the forum....and he has battled on to defend QR where possible.

[ozbob]

^ I think its been pretty obvious since railfail onset that HTG is affiliated with QR....he has been the single biggest 'to QR`s defense' poster on the forum..
Credit given...he has stuck around and watched the consistent flaming of his organisation by many and sundry here on the forum....and he has battled on to defend QR where possible.

I always value the input from HTG and other informed members.  I don't think people ' flame ' they may have grievances with the system issues and that is fine.  HTG and others often correct misinformed points of view and that is always welcome.  I think what we want in the end is the same, a rail revolution leading a world class public transport network!   

[HappyTrainGuy]

Say what you want but my last pst wasn't defending. It was just giving input/corrections/insight. Just giving a bit more insight into things most people don't know anything about especially when media exaggerate some angles. Like a train having a spad when the signaling system goes into safe mode as the train is approaching or passing a signal by 1m. If I was defending then why did I make reference to the one serious spad involving two trains but isn't mentioned within the courier mails dates. They mentioned the first spad at that signal but didn't mention the more serious second incident.

[Stillwater]

I appreciate your advice and insight HTG

[PoliticalFootball]

Say what you want but my last pst wasn't defending. It was just giving input/corrections/insight. Just giving a bit more insight into things most people don't know anything about especially when media exaggerate some angles. Like a train having a spad when the signaling system goes into safe mode as the train is approaching or passing a signal by 1m. If I was defending then why did I make reference to the one serious spad involving two trains but isn't mentioned within the courier mails dates. They mentioned the first spad at that signal but didn't mention the more serious second incident.

Can certainly appreciate that. The Courier Mail is one of the worst around for actual fact checking.

[ozbob]

https://www.queenslandrail.com.au/about%20us/Pages/Safety-and-Security.aspx

[ozbob]

Extract Hansard Estimates - Transport and Main Roads (Proof)

> https://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/documents/hansard/2018/2018_07_27_EstimatesTPC.pdf  page 38 onwards

Mr MINNIKIN: My question is to the minister. With reference to page 11 of the SDS under the
heading 'Transport Safety and Regulation', the safety of transport networks, and page 15 of the SDS
under the heading 'Passenger Transport Services', can you explain to this committee why 2017 was
the worst year in almost a decade for signals passed at danger, known as SPAD?

Mr BAILEY: I thank the honourable member for the question. Can I just add a little to the previous
question and answer? The reporting of driver productivity occurred for the first time in response to the
Strachan recommendations via the city's train response unit. The number of 33.8 per cent compares
favourably to, for instance, the average driver productivity in 2013 of 28.9 per cent which was there
under the member for Chatsworth when he was the assistant minister for public transport.

Mr MINNIKIN: On-time running.

Mr BAILEY: A sizeable difference there of five per cent in those two figures. I think that was worth
noting. In terms of signals passed at danger, we certainly take safety on the rail network very seriously.
Every single instance of a signal passed at danger is thoroughly investigated. Queensland Rail's
dedicated Signals Passed At Danger Prevention Task Force formed in October of last year by the
Palaszczuk government has already prepared a comprehensive strategy aimed at reducing the signals
passed at danger rate.

In February 2018 the task force commenced implementing a broad range of additional safety
controls and new initiatives focusing on human factors, driver style, increased levels of engagement
and improvements in signals passed at danger awareness. While Queensland Rail saw a slight
increase in the rate of signals passed at danger on its network from July 2017 to January 2018, since
the implementation of initiatives by the task force from February of this year there has already been a
stabilisation of this trend with the SPAD rates decreasing by more than seven per cent from January to
June 2018 from 2.53 to 2.35.

Overall, the SPAD rates remain low and have not risen in proportion to the increased train
movements and the resulting increase in red signals approached by train drivers, with Queensland Rail
currently recording one SPAD for approximately every 24,000 red signals approached. Signals passed
at danger instances are an industry wide issue by rail operators all over the world. Dedicated resources
have been allocated to the task force to accelerate the implementation of priority SPAD improvement
initiatives which have been informed by detailed SPAD investigations, research, benchmarking and
industry best practice.

The task force has progressed a number of initiatives, including introducing new toolbox talks
and prestart processes with train crew and train control employees, regularly reviewing signalling
infrastructure and increased communication with employees regarding SPADs and their prevention.
Queensland Rail is also analysing event recorder data from incident free running. This will assist with
identifying train handling behaviour that has a known relationship to SPAD causation in an effort to
further improve driver training and awareness. Through regular reviews of signalling infrastructure and
SPAD data, Queensland Rail recently identified an opportunity to improve the safety of signalling at
Normanby through the installation of a permanent yellow signal to be installed at the location to reduce
the likelihood of misperceiving the signal track alignment. This work is expected to be completed by
October of this year.

The implementation, of course, of the European Train Control System, expected to be completed
by financial year 2022, will effectively eliminate the risk of SPADs through automated engineering
controls which will ensure that trains stop within the limits of their authority in the event of human error.
I do note that there is substantial funding in the budget this year, Mr Chair, for a European Train Control
System. We are very committed to it. It is a safer system. It is being funded and, of course, once it is
fully implemented we will see this issue largely dealt with.

Mr MINNIKIN: A couple of other quick questions on SPAD please?

CHAIR: Yes.

Mr MINNIKIN: Are you able to confirm that despite the potential for serious accidents, under the
deal made with the powerful RTBU drivers can have multiple SPAD events without ever being demoted
back to guard?

Mr BAILEY: I thank the honourable member for the question. Can I say that this is certainly a
matter for Queensland Rail to comment on so I might ask the CEO to come up. But there are certainly
provisions in relation to the organisation's response to SPAD events.

Mr Easy: Would you mind repeating that question for me?

Mr MINNIKIN: Certainly. It was asked of the minister if he was able to confirm that despite the
potential for serious accidents under the deal made with the powerful RTBU drivers can have multiple
SPAD events recorded without being demoted back to a guard.

Mr Easy: I thank the honourable member for the question. I am not aware of any deal that you
are referring to in relation to that.

CHAIR: Are you referring to the enterprise bargaining agreement?

Mr MINNIKIN: Yes.

Mr Easy: In terms of a SPAD or signal passed at danger, when it does occur we treat those very
seriously. Every one of those involves an investigation. The driver is removed from the network. We
complete the investigation. There are times when we take disciplinary action in relation to that. It would
not be appropriate to be commenting on any individual circumstances, but we take each investigation
seriously. We consider the cause of the incident and we consider what controls might be put in place.
We also consider what appropriate measures should be taken with respect to the driver. Sometimes
that does involve rehabilitation. Sometimes that does involve disciplinary action. But in reference to any
pre-agreed arrangement as to how we would manage those matters, that is certainly not to my
knowledge.

Mr MINNIKIN: There are incidences or examples, are there not, of drivers who have had more
than one SPAD red card incident—so at least two or three or more—who have actually been transferred
back to being a guard? I know you cannot comment on individuals but just as a general question.
Mr Easy: I thank the honourable member for the follow-up question. I think if we look at history
and over time going back many years there would be examples where there are multiple SPAD events
by a single driver. That is certainly not a new occurrence. I think that is something we have seen happen
over many years and if we go back through the records that would demonstrate that. I think our
approach today is very robust. We take, as I said, each investigation very seriously. We engage with
the individual drivers to ensure that we have the best response, which includes the controls, the
approach to management of our drivers. We are putting in place many new measures for our drivers in
respect to SPADs which comes as a result of the comprehensive risk management strategy we have
in place. That includes in-cab engagement, it includes toolbox talks with our train controllers. We have
a 10-point prestart process for our drivers prior to them commencing revenue services and we also are
going to the lengths of employing a psychologist to provide assistance around the human behavioural
aspects of incidents that involve SPADs on our network. We have a very comprehensive approach and
we are seeing a reduction in the rolling 12-month average, as has been said, from what was a slight
increase to January of 2.53 to now what is 2.35 for the month of January.

Mr MINNIKIN: My last question was to Mr Easy, while he is at the table.

CHAIR: Yes.

Mr MINNIKIN: Can you guarantee commuters that SPADs and failing to stop at stations or simply
cancelling a train are not linked to an attempt by Queensland Rail to address poor on-time running and
performance metrics?

Mr Easy: I thank the honourable member for the question. I do not think there is any relationship
between SPADs and on-time running.

[ozbob]

https://twitter.com/Robert_Dow/status/1027798645377097733

[ozbob]

https://twitter.com/Robert_Dow/status/1038965489471447042

[ozbob]

The West Australian --> Perth train drivers in red signals incidents

Inattentive, tired and stressed drivers have been blamed for several incidents on Perth's rail network where trains dangerously overshot warning signals.

Figures obtained by The Weekend West for 2017-18 show that 15 drivers passed red warning signals when they were not authorised to do so. Five of the incidents happened at McIver station at the interchange for the Midland and Armadale lines.

One incident occurred at the new Perth stadium station during West Coast's first match at the venue.

Most of the drivers involved were put on a retraining program and had resumed their normal work.

One driver was referred to a sleep specialist, while another driver was provided with stress management assistance.

Despite the number of incidents — slightly fewer than 16 in 2016-17 — the Public Transport Authority said passengers were not at risk because WA was the only State with an automatic braking system on its trains.

Known as Automatic Train Protection, this system has been in place on the Transperth system since electrification of the rail system in the early 1990s.

"ATP works in conjunction with signals and registers when a train has passed a signal at danger and automatically applies the brakes of the train," PTA spokesman David Hynes said.

"ATP makes our rail system the safest in the nation.

"It should give passengers every confidence in travelling with us."

In Australia and many other countries incidents where train drivers run red lights are identified as part of the scheme Signal Passed At Danger.

The 15 incidents in WA last year were picked up by SPAD. They equate to 0.64 incidents per million kilometres of rail, compared with 2.1 incidents per million kilometres of rail recorded in Queensland last year.

[ozbob]

Couriermail --> Quick-thinking train guard saves day after trains fails to stop at red signal

A BRISBANE train guard who deployed an emergency brake helped avoid a potentially serious crash last year after the driver had failed to stop at a red light despite repeated emergency warnings.

An ATSB investigation into the incident on October 12 last year found the train, which was returning from Kippa-Ring to Bowen Hills, was finally pulled up 83m before converging onto tracks opened for another train.

Investigators found the train passed two yellow warning signals just south of Petrie Station, with the driver manually acknowledging the warnings after an automatic warning system triggered an in-cab alert.

The driver then passed a red signal but told investigators he did not see it because he was "focused on the preceding train and not the signal indication directly in front".

The train passed through the red signal travelling about 41km/h, alerting a network control officer who issued an emergency radio broadcast calling for the train to stop.

The driver thought the call was for another train but did slow down to walking pace, the report says.

As the train slowed, the guard believed it was about to stop and radioed back to the control officer that the situation was under control.

But then the train driver, still unaware that he had driven through the red light, started to speed up.

"In response the guard opened the brake pipe cock, causing an emergency brake application that brought the train to a complete stop," the report says.

The train stopped about 320m past the red signal, just short of entering a track opened for another train that was a few kilometres away.

"The action of the guard opening the brake pipe cock, causing an emergency brake application, was a positive action that prevented a potentially more serious incident," the ATSB found.

The driver told investigators that he had been feeling unwell and was subsequently diagnosed with a severe respiratory tract infection.

The ATSB concluded that QR's proposed introduction of an automatic train protection system would "remove the human element from the decision making process".

QR is currently seeking expressions of interest from market leaders for the technology, which would automatically apply to brakes and stop a train before danger if "no or improper action is taken by the driver".

ATSB > https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2017/rair/ro-2017-015/

[ozbob]

^ this is why calling for DOO is a waste of time until there is full ATP on the network.

[red dragin]

^ this is why calling for DOO is a waste of time until there is full ATP on the network.

Yep, I think that puts a nail in the coffin of that argument for now.

[bretto82]

The other thing in the report was that the spad rate is comparable with Melbourne and Sydney

[ozbob]

Sydney Trains are installing ATP

Automatic Train Protection > https://www.transport.nsw.gov.au/projects/current-projects/automatic-train-protection

ATP is being rolled out across the Sydney Trains and NSW TrainLink electrified network including the South Coast Line as far as Kiama, the Blue Mountains Line to Lithgow, and the Central Coast / Newcastle Line.

Melbourne has trip stops at signals that apply the brakes if a train passes a red.  It is crude form of ATP.  They also have an improved Vigilance control system

[ozbob]

The present approach in Queensland is to only do sections of the network - ETCS.

https://www.queenslandrail.com.au/inthecommunity/projects/current-projects/european-train-control-system

http://statements.qld.gov.au/Statement/2016/6/14/more-than-half-a-billion-dollars-to-pave-way-for-cross-river-rail

The entire network needs ATP.  That is what Sydney is doing.  Queensland is always ' half baked ' ... 

I am rapidly coming to the viewpoint that the entire Citytrain network needs ATP (ETCS).

[SurfRail]

I don't think there is any suggestion that isn't the plan, just that it is taking forever and that the initial focus is on getting it right for the core before rolling it out further.

[ozbob]

I don't think there is any suggestion that isn't the plan, just that it is taking forever and that the initial focus is on getting it right for the core before rolling it out further.

http://buildingqueensland.qld.gov.au/projects/european-train-control-system-etcs-inner-city/

" The proposal will deliver the European Train Control System across the inner city rail network between Northgate and Milton stations."

Milton to Northgate and CRR is all they have specified.  At least they will have to have that in place by 2024.  As for the rest of the network (suburban) I don't think they have really considered it at all to be frank.  Nothing to suggest they have that I have seen. I will ask QR.  Hope they have but ...

[SurfRail]

My take on it has been that is all they have contracted to do because it is a massive job.  You need to have signal balises all over the system, have the equipment fitted to every train (including trains not run by QR but which would be transiting through the affected sections of the network) etc etc.  I would be very surprised if they weren't planning for it systemwide but it isn't cheap, easy or quick.

[ozbob]

Checked with QR. There is nothing other than this procurement for now. In time it's hoped that ETCS roll out would continue but nothing formal in place. I think this is something we should support and get it into some sort of commitment framework.

[ozbob]

https://twitter.com/railbotforum/status/1050771244302233601

[ozbob]

https://twitter.com/railbotforum/status/1061349670696284161

[Fares_Fair]

Why are SPADS quoted / graphed as 'per million kilometers'?
Do we refer to cars running red lights per million kilometres?

I guess without a second metric you wouldn't have a graph. 

Why not show the actual number under the graph?

Given the record on how statistics are reported, it's hard to have any confidence in the data.