Rail crash Spain

[ozbob]

Couriermail --> Camera captures horrific Spanish train crashing as driver reportedly admits to speeding at 190km/h

A SECURITY camera has captured the moment when a Spanish train crashes into a wall, as one of the drivers admits to speeding.

The train flew off the tracks as it reportedly tore at twice the speed limit around a bend in northwestern Spain, killing at least 80 passengers and injuring more than 140 in the nation's deadliest rail disaster since 1944 ....

[ozbob]

I would have thought that this system would have ATP?

[BrizCommuter]

The lack of ATP, or non-functioning of ATP is quite a concern!

This crash could theoretically happen in Brisbane.

[techblitz]

Well we do know that the tilt train crash in 04 was because of the exact same thing. And only 112 km/h luckily

[BrizCommuter]

http://brizcommuter.blogspot.com.au/2013/07/spanish-train-crash-could-similar.html
Could a similar crash occur in Brisbane and SE Queensland?

[ozbob]

Media release 9th April 2013



SEQ: Suburban rail network needs Automatic Train Protection too!

RAIL Back On Track (http://backontrack.org) a web based community support group for rail and public transport and an advocate for public transport passengers has said the introduction of Automatic Train Protection (ATP) which incorporates improved signalling is well overdue on the suburban rail network in SEQ (1).

Robert Dow, Spokesman for RAIL Back On Track said:

"Automatic Train Protection (ATP) is a system that relays signal information, track speed information and other track information to trains, and can automatically slow or stop trains if they exceed the track speeds or approach signals at STOP at too high a speed. It will also stop trains that pass a signal at STOP unless a specific procedure is followed."

"There are concerns with rail safety generally and it is time that ATP was introduced on the suburban rail network."

ATP is needed because:

Safety - the current Automatic Warning System installed on Queensland Rail's suburban network will not prevent crashes or derailments caused by:

1) Excessive speed around corners or through switches.
2) Excessive speed through red signals compromising the safe stopping distance.
3) Excessive speed through yellow signals, again compromising the safe stopping distance.
4) Excessive speed on approach to dead end tracks, such as at termini.

ATP will prevent the majority of crashes caused by the above.

Capacity - ATP in conjunction with a high capacity signalling system such as European Railway Traffic Management System - ERTMS - level 2 allows for higher train frequencies and/or higher reliability.  This is important as we approach maximum capacity limits on the Merivale Bridge.

Cost savings - ERTMS level 2 has less track wayside equipment, reducing equipment maintenance costs.  Longer term significant cost savings.

Open market - as ERTMS is standards based, multiple manufacturers can bid for contracts. Multiple manufacturers can also be involved in a contract. Leads times may be faster, and approval processes may be simplified.

"It appears that moves to implement ATP have stalled (3).  We can really afford to wait any longer?"

References:

1. Automatic Train Protection (ATP) http://www.railsafe.org.au/section.jsp?id=8684

2. The European Railway Traffic Management System (ERTMS)  http://www.ertms.net/ertms/ertms-in-brief.aspx

3. Rail Safety Systems Assessment of the South East Queensland Rail Network http://www.tmr.qld.gov.au/~/media/Safety/railsafety/rail%20safety%20systems%20assessment%20of%20seq%20rail%20network%20update%202.pdf

Contact:

Robert Dow
Administration
admin@backontrack.org
RAIL Back On Track http://backontrack.org

[ozbob]

Railway Gazette

http://www.railwaygazette.com/news/single-view/view/overspeed-suspected-in-santiago-de-compostela-derailment.html

Overspeed suspected in Santiago de Compostela derailment   

SPAIN: At 20.41 on July 24 a Madrid - Ferrol Alvia service derailed on a curve on the approach to Santiago de Compostela. Formed of a Class 730 gauge-convertible electro-diesel Talgo trainset, the 15.00 from Madrid was carrying 218 passengers, according to a joint statement from Spanish train operator RENFE and infrastructure manager ADIF.

The train had 12 vehicles, with an electric and a diesel power car at the ends. The rear power cars appear to have caught fire after the impact, and one of the intermediate coaches was thrown up on to an adjacent road; other cars rolled over or struck a retaining wall. Reports on July 25 indicated that 79 people had died in the accident with many more injured.

The train had left the high speed alignment and should have been slowing in preparation for the stop at Santiago station, about 3 to 4 km from the site of the accident. The speed limit on the curve is understood to be 80 km/h, but Spanish media reported that the train driver had said over the train radio that the train had been travelling at 190 km/h. A video taken from a lineside security camera appeared to show coaches behind the front power cars derailing first, pulling the heavier leading vehicles over as the train rounded the curve.

Whereas Spain's high speed standard gauge lines are equipped with ERTMS, Spanish media suggested that this section of the route which had opened in December 2011 was fitted only with the standard Spanish ASFA train warning equipment.

[ozbob]

Sent to all outlets

26th July 2013

Suburban rail network needs Automatic Train Protection too!

Railway Gazette

http://www.railwaygazette.com/news/single-view/view/overspeed-suspected-in-santiago-de-compostela-derailment.html

Overspeed suspected in Santiago de Compostela derailment   

SPAIN: At 20.41 on July 24 a Madrid - Ferrol Alvia service derailed on a curve on the approach to Santiago de Compostela. Formed of a Class 730 gauge-convertible electro-diesel Talgo trainset, the 15.00 from Madrid was carrying 218 passengers, according to a joint statement from Spanish train operator RENFE and infrastructure manager ADIF.

The train had 12 vehicles, with an electric and a diesel power car at the ends. The rear power cars appear to have caught fire after the impact, and one of the intermediate coaches was thrown up on to an adjacent road; other cars rolled over or struck a retaining wall. Reports on July 25 indicated that 79 people had died in the accident with many more injured.

The train had left the high speed alignment and should have been slowing in preparation for the stop at Santiago station, about 3 to 4 km from the site of the accident. The speed limit on the curve is understood to be 80 km/h, but Spanish media reported that the train driver had said over the train radio that the train had been travelling at 190 km/h. A video taken from a lineside security camera appeared to show coaches behind the front power cars derailing first, pulling the heavier leading vehicles over as the train rounded the curve.

Whereas Spain's high speed standard gauge lines are equipped with ERTMS, Spanish media suggested that this section of the route which had opened in December 2011 was fitted only with the standard Spanish ASFA train warning equipment.

Media release 9th April 2013 re-released 26th July 2013



SEQ: Suburban rail network needs Automatic Train Protection too!

RAIL Back On Track (http://backontrack.org) a web based community support group for rail and public transport and an advocate for public transport passengers has said the introduction of Automatic Train Protection (ATP) which incorporates improved signalling is well overdue on the suburban rail network in SEQ (1).

Robert Dow, Spokesman for RAIL Back On Track said:

"Automatic Train Protection (ATP) is a system that relays signal information, track speed information and other track information to trains, and can automatically slow or stop trains if they exceed the track speeds or approach signals at STOP at too high a speed. It will also stop trains that pass a signal at STOP unless a specific procedure is followed."

"There are concerns with rail safety generally and it is time that ATP was introduced on the suburban rail network."

ATP is needed because:

Safety - the current Automatic Warning System installed on Queensland Rail's suburban network will not prevent crashes or derailments caused by:

1) Excessive speed around corners or through switches.
2) Excessive speed through red signals compromising the safe stopping distance.
3) Excessive speed through yellow signals, again compromising the safe stopping distance.
4) Excessive speed on approach to dead end tracks, such as at termini.

ATP will prevent the majority of crashes caused by the above.

Capacity - ATP in conjunction with a high capacity signalling system such as European Railway Traffic Management System - ERTMS - level 2 allows for higher train frequencies and/or higher reliability.  This is important as we approach maximum capacity limits on the Merivale Bridge.

Cost savings - ERTMS level 2 has less track wayside equipment, reducing equipment maintenance costs.  Longer term significant cost savings.

Open market - as ERTMS is standards based, multiple manufacturers can bid for contracts. Multiple manufacturers can also be involved in a contract. Leads times may be faster, and approval processes may be simplified.

"It appears that moves to implement ATP have stalled (3).  We can really afford to wait any longer?"

References:

1. Automatic Train Protection (ATP) http://www.railsafe.org.au/section.jsp?id=8684

2. The European Railway Traffic Management System (ERTMS)  http://www.ertms.net/ertms/ertms-in-brief.aspx

3. Rail Safety Systems Assessment of the South East Queensland Rail Network http://www.tmr.qld.gov.au/~/media/Safety/railsafety/rail%20safety%20systems%20assessment%20of%20seq%20rail%20network%20update%202.pdf

Contact:

Robert Dow
Administration
admin@backontrack.org
RAIL Back On Track http://backontrack.org

[ozbob]

BBC News --> Spanish derailment: Possible causes

[ozbob]

Couriermail --> Spanish train driver Francisco Jose Garzon Amo 'was on phone', reading and speeding at time of crash

... Authorities have said that a high-tech automatic braking program called the European Rail Traffic Management System was installed on most of the high-speed track leading from Madrid north to Santiago de Compostela - the route Garzon's train took.

But the cutting-edge coverage stops just five kilometres south of where the crash occurred, placing a greater burden on the driver to take charge.

The Spanish rail company has said the brakes should have been applied four kilometers (2.5 miles) before the train hit the curve ...

[ozbob]

Sent to all outlets:

31st July 2013

Couriermail --> Spanish train driver Francisco Jose Garzon Amo 'was on phone', reading and speeding at time of crash

... Authorities have said that a high-tech automatic braking program called the European Rail Traffic Management System was installed on most of the high-speed track leading from Madrid north to Santiago de Compostela - the route Garzon's train took.

    But the cutting-edge coverage stops just five kilometres south of where the crash occurred, placing a greater burden on the driver to take charge.

    The Spanish rail company has said the brakes should have been applied four kilometers (2.5 miles) before the train hit the curve ...

Sent to all outlets

26th July 2013

Suburban rail network needs Automatic Train Protection too!

Railway Gazette

http://www.railwaygazette.com/news/single-view/view/overspeed-suspected-in-santiago-de-compostela-derailment.html

Overspeed suspected in Santiago de Compostela derailment   

SPAIN: At 20.41 on July 24 a Madrid - Ferrol Alvia service derailed on a curve on the approach to Santiago de Compostela. Formed of a Class 730 gauge-convertible electro-diesel Talgo trainset, the 15.00 from Madrid was carrying 218 passengers, according to a joint statement from Spanish train operator RENFE and infrastructure manager ADIF.

The train had 12 vehicles, with an electric and a diesel power car at the ends. The rear power cars appear to have caught fire after the impact, and one of the intermediate coaches was thrown up on to an adjacent road; other cars rolled over or struck a retaining wall. Reports on July 25 indicated that 79 people had died in the accident with many more injured.

The train had left the high speed alignment and should have been slowing in preparation for the stop at Santiago station, about 3 to 4 km from the site of the accident. The speed limit on the curve is understood to be 80 km/h, but Spanish media reported that the train driver had said over the train radio that the train had been travelling at 190 km/h. A video taken from a lineside security camera appeared to show coaches behind the front power cars derailing first, pulling the heavier leading vehicles over as the train rounded the curve.

Whereas Spain's high speed standard gauge lines are equipped with ERTMS, Spanish media suggested that this section of the route which had opened in December 2011 was fitted only with the standard Spanish ASFA train warning equipment.

Media release 9th April 2013 re-released 26th July 2013



SEQ: Suburban rail network needs Automatic Train Protection too!

RAIL Back On Track (http://backontrack.org) a web based community support group for rail and public transport and an advocate for public transport passengers has said the introduction of Automatic Train Protection (ATP) which incorporates improved signalling is well overdue on the suburban rail network in SEQ (1).

Robert Dow, Spokesman for RAIL Back On Track said:

"Automatic Train Protection (ATP) is a system that relays signal information, track speed information and other track information to trains, and can automatically slow or stop trains if they exceed the track speeds or approach signals at STOP at too high a speed. It will also stop trains that pass a signal at STOP unless a specific procedure is followed."

"There are concerns with rail safety generally and it is time that ATP was introduced on the suburban rail network."

ATP is needed because:

Safety - the current Automatic Warning System installed on Queensland Rail's suburban network will not prevent crashes or derailments caused by:

1) Excessive speed around corners or through switches.
2) Excessive speed through red signals compromising the safe stopping distance.
3) Excessive speed through yellow signals, again compromising the safe stopping distance.
4) Excessive speed on approach to dead end tracks, such as at termini.

ATP will prevent the majority of crashes caused by the above.

Capacity - ATP in conjunction with a high capacity signalling system such as European Railway Traffic Management System - ERTMS - level 2 allows for higher train frequencies and/or higher reliability.  This is important as we approach maximum capacity limits on the Merivale Bridge.

Cost savings - ERTMS level 2 has less track wayside equipment, reducing equipment maintenance costs.  Longer term significant cost savings.

Open market - as ERTMS is standards based, multiple manufacturers can bid for contracts. Multiple manufacturers can also be involved in a contract. Leads times may be faster, and approval processes may be simplified.

"It appears that moves to implement ATP have stalled (3).  We can really afford to wait any longer?"

References:

1. Automatic Train Protection (ATP) http://www.railsafe.org.au/section.jsp?id=8684

2. The European Railway Traffic Management System (ERTMS)  http://www.ertms.net/ertms/ertms-in-brief.aspx

3. Rail Safety Systems Assessment of the South East Queensland Rail Network http://www.tmr.qld.gov.au/~/media/Safety/railsafety/rail%20safety%20systems%20assessment%20of%20seq%20rail%20network%20update%202.pdf

Contact:

Robert Dow
Administration
admin@backontrack.org
RAIL Back On Track http://backontrack.org

[ozbob]

Couriermail --> Automatic braking system had been planned

[ozbob]

Sent to all outlets:

9th August 2013

Re: SEQ: Suburban rail network needs Automatic Train Protection too!

Greetings,

Couriermail --> Automatic braking system had been planned

Anyone  know what has happened to ATP for suburban trains In Queensland?

An issue a little more pressing than Segways I would have thought.

Best wishes
Robert

Robert Dow
Administration
admin@backontrack.org
RAIL Back On Track http://backontrack.org

Sent to all outlets:

31st July 2013

Couriermail --> Spanish train driver Francisco Jose Garzon Amo 'was on phone', reading and speeding at time of crash

... Authorities have said that a high-tech automatic braking program called the European Rail Traffic Management System was installed on most of the high-speed track leading from Madrid north to Santiago de Compostela - the route Garzon's train took.

    But the cutting-edge coverage stops just five kilometres south of where the crash occurred, placing a greater burden on the driver to take charge.

    The Spanish rail company has said the brakes should have been applied four kilometers (2.5 miles) before the train hit the curve ...

Sent to all outlets

26th July 2013

Suburban rail network needs Automatic Train Protection too!

Railway Gazette

http://www.railwaygazette.com/news/single-view/view/overspeed-suspected-in-santiago-de-compostela-derailment.html

Overspeed suspected in Santiago de Compostela derailment   

SPAIN: At 20.41 on July 24 a Madrid - Ferrol Alvia service derailed on a curve on the approach to Santiago de Compostela. Formed of a Class 730 gauge-convertible electro-diesel Talgo trainset, the 15.00 from Madrid was carrying 218 passengers, according to a joint statement from Spanish train operator RENFE and infrastructure manager ADIF.

The train had 12 vehicles, with an electric and a diesel power car at the ends. The rear power cars appear to have caught fire after the impact, and one of the intermediate coaches was thrown up on to an adjacent road; other cars rolled over or struck a retaining wall. Reports on July 25 indicated that 79 people had died in the accident with many more injured.

The train had left the high speed alignment and should have been slowing in preparation for the stop at Santiago station, about 3 to 4 km from the site of the accident. The speed limit on the curve is understood to be 80 km/h, but Spanish media reported that the train driver had said over the train radio that the train had been travelling at 190 km/h. A video taken from a lineside security camera appeared to show coaches behind the front power cars derailing first, pulling the heavier leading vehicles over as the train rounded the curve.

Whereas Spain's high speed standard gauge lines are equipped with ERTMS, Spanish media suggested that this section of the route which had opened in December 2011 was fitted only with the standard Spanish ASFA train warning equipment.

Media release 9th April 2013 re-released 26th July 2013



SEQ: Suburban rail network needs Automatic Train Protection too!

RAIL Back On Track (http://backontrack.org) a web based community support group for rail and public transport and an advocate for public transport passengers has said the introduction of Automatic Train Protection (ATP) which incorporates improved signalling is well overdue on the suburban rail network in SEQ (1).

Robert Dow, Spokesman for RAIL Back On Track said:

"Automatic Train Protection (ATP) is a system that relays signal information, track speed information and other track information to trains, and can automatically slow or stop trains if they exceed the track speeds or approach signals at STOP at too high a speed. It will also stop trains that pass a signal at STOP unless a specific procedure is followed."

"There are concerns with rail safety generally and it is time that ATP was introduced on the suburban rail network."

ATP is needed because:

Safety - the current Automatic Warning System installed on Queensland Rail's suburban network will not prevent crashes or derailments caused by:

1) Excessive speed around corners or through switches.
2) Excessive speed through red signals compromising the safe stopping distance.
3) Excessive speed through yellow signals, again compromising the safe stopping distance.
4) Excessive speed on approach to dead end tracks, such as at termini.

ATP will prevent the majority of crashes caused by the above.

Capacity - ATP in conjunction with a high capacity signalling system such as European Railway Traffic Management System - ERTMS - level 2 allows for higher train frequencies and/or higher reliability.  This is important as we approach maximum capacity limits on the Merivale Bridge.

Cost savings - ERTMS level 2 has less track wayside equipment, reducing equipment maintenance costs.  Longer term significant cost savings.

Open market - as ERTMS is standards based, multiple manufacturers can bid for contracts. Multiple manufacturers can also be involved in a contract. Leads times may be faster, and approval processes may be simplified.

"It appears that moves to implement ATP have stalled (3).  We can really afford to wait any longer?"

References:

1. Automatic Train Protection (ATP) http://www.railsafe.org.au/section.jsp?id=8684

2. The European Railway Traffic Management System (ERTMS)  http://www.ertms.net/ertms/ertms-in-brief.aspx

3. Rail Safety Systems Assessment of the South East Queensland Rail Network http://www.tmr.qld.gov.au/~/media/Safety/railsafety/rail%20safety%20systems%20assessment%20of%20seq%20rail%20network%20update%202.pdf

Contact:

Robert Dow
Administration
admin@backontrack.org
RAIL Back On Track http://backontrack.org

[SteelPan]

To be honest, I staggered, that in 2013, in any developed country, the type of accidents experienced recently in Spain and a few years back with the Tilt Train, right here in Qld can occur - something is very wrong!